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TYING LAW AND POLICY:
A DECISION-THEORETIC APPROACH
KEITH

N.

HYLTON

MICHAEL SALINGER*

I. INTRODUCTION
Like much of antitrust, tying law and theory have developed gradually
through a colloquy between the courts and academic commentators.
Both law and theory can be divided into roughly three developmental
periods: "classical," "Chicago School," and "post-Chicago." In the classical
period, antitrust courts developed a complicated per se prohibition based
on the theory that the motive for tying was to leverage market power
from the tying to the tied product. Classical tying doctrine and theory
came under attack from the Chicago School from the 1950s to the 1970s. l
Armed with a set of arguments drawn from microeconomic theory, the
Chicago School suggested that tying should be lawful per se. The Chicago
School critique seemed to have an impact on the law, as the Supreme
Court took an increasingly narrow view of the scope of the per se prohibition. Indeed, by the mid-1980s, in itsJefferson Parishdecision,2 the Court
came within one vote of overturning the per se rule. But even as the
Supreme Court was fracturing over the appropriate rule in JeffersonParish,
3
the post-Chicago School analyses began to appear in academic journals
Much of this literature applied arguments based on game theory to show
* Keith N. Hylton is Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, and Michael
Salinger is Professor and Chairman of the Finance and Economics Department, Boston
University School of Management. Brian Kaiser, Seema Srinivasan, and Kirstyn Walton
provided research assistance. The authors acknowledge the financial support of Boston
University and Microsoft Corporation. The views expressed in this article are solely those
of the authors.
I For an early example, see Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade
Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 281 (1956). For discussions of the Chicago School approach,
see RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); ROBERT
H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
2

Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
1 See, e.g., Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON.

REv. 267 (1983); Thomas Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising

Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). For an early survey, see
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. RiEv. 213 (1985).

ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69

that tying and similar tactics could be anticompetitive after all, in contrast
to the Chicago School's conclusions. The post-Chicago literature has
not had the same influence on the courts to this point as did the Chicago
School writings, but it has affected some decisions, notably the Supreme
Court's Eastman Kodak4 decision and the district court's decision in the
5
Microsoft litigation.
This paper presents an assessment of post-Chicago tying law and theory
and offers a decision-theoretic 6 framework for analyzing tying doctrine.
The decision-theoretic framework takes into account the likelihood of
judicial error in the application of rules and the costs of such error.
Although this is by no means the first application of decision theory
to antitrust, 7 our approach differs from previous work by stressing the
importance of the relative frequencies of pro- and anticompetitive conduct in such an analysis. It is especially important to apply decision
analysis to the post-Chicago literature because, as our exposition will
make clear, the game theory underpinning the literature rests on highly
stylized assumptions that are difficult to apply to the factual settings
courts confront. One of our main points is that the literature does
not contain clear guidance on how to distinguish benign from harmful
instances of tying. A rational policy must therefore take account of errors
that will inevitably occur.
Three general themes run throughout much of our analysis. First, the
per se rule against tying simply has no economic foundation. The courts
seem to recognize this, and have tried to preserve the per se rule while
limiting the conditions under which it applies. 8 From an economic standpoint, however, there is no basis for a per se rule, even given the condiI Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). The Court
adopted several post-Chicago arguments, and in footnote 21 cited one article from the
post-Chicago literature (Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient
Regulation of Consumer Information, 24J.L. & ECON. 491 (1981)).
5 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Findings of Fact);
United States v. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp.2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (Conclusions of Law). Judge
Jackson's Findings of Fact seem to mirror some of the arguments made by the government's
economic experts in the trial, and these arguments were influenced by the postChicago literature.
I For a general treatment of decision theory, see HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS
(1968). See also Steven C. Salop, Evaluating UncertainEvidence with Sir Thomas Bayes: A Note
for Teachers, 1 J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1987, at 155.
7 For an earlier important contribution, see C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop,
Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999).
1 See infra Part II.A.1. In particular, in Jefferson Parish the Supreme Court said that the
per se rule applies only when (1) the seller has tied separate products, Jefferson Parish,466
U.S. at 20-21; (2) the seller has market power in the tying product, id. at 17; (3) the tie
leads to a substantial foreclosure of commerce in the tied market, id. at 16.
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tions established in Jefferson Parishfor triggering the rule.9 Second, the
post-Chicago literature merely established the theoretical possibility of
anticompetitive tying-and even then under conditions more burdensome to plaintiffs than those established in the case law."0 Put another
way, the post-Chicago literature has given us a set of necessary, as opposed
to sufficient, conditions for triggering antitrust scrutiny. Under the
decision-theoretic approach, however, one must know the frequency of
anticompetitive tying to formulate a rational legal rule. Moreover, in
formulating a rule, the prevalence of tying for procompetitive reasons
is an important consideration. Because beneficial tying is so pervasive,
rules against tying could be harmful even with a small rate of falsely
labeling tying as anticompetitive. Third, the most plausible post-Chicago
theory of anticompetitive tying is based on the assumption that the tying
and tied goods are complementary and that they are both susceptible
to market power and, indeed, monopoly. It is a long-established principle
of economics, however, that integrated complementary monopoly results
in lower prices than distinct complementary monopolies." A public
policy that imparts a bias toward independent complementary monopolies instead of integrated complementary monopolies has the predictable
consequence of raising prices and reducing consumer welfare.
We also use the decision-theoretic framework to assess the proper
legal rule regarding technological integration. This is an important issue
in the Microsoft litigation, in which reviewing courts have had to determine whether it was lawful for Microsoft to integrate the Internet
Explorer Web browser with the Windows operating system. The most
important decision to come from that litigation is the D.C. Circuit's
Microsoft 11112 opinion, which articulates a rule of reason test for cases
involving integration of a software application with an operating system.
Given the risk that Microsoft III and other appellate decisions in the
Microsoft litigation could establish standards that will be applied across
9 For a detailed discussion of Jefferson Parish,see infra Part II.A.2. One might argue that
the separate-products inquiry of Jefferson Parish makes the per se rule equivalent to a rule
of reason test. We consider and reject that argument in Part II.A.2.
1
0 In particular, the Whinston model (see infra Part II.C.1) shows that tying may be
anticompetitive when the market for the tied good is potentially oligopolistic because of
the presence of entry barriers. This suggests that in addition to the conditions required
by Jefferson Parish (separate products, market power in tying good, substantial foreclosure
in tied market), the presence of entry barriers in the tied good should be listed as a fourth
necessary condition for triggering the per se rule. We are unable in our analysis below (infta
Part III.C) to identify a set of factors among those discussed in the literature and case
law that would justify a court's decision to treat these four conditions as sufficient for
triggering per se analysis.
1 SeeJEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 174 (1988).
i2 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Microsoft III).
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the board to all cases of technological integration, it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this issue. Legal standards that excessively discourage technological integration could be quite harmful to the whole
economy, not just high-technology or software markets. Of course, an
ideal standard should also avoid granting legal immunity to anticompetitive tying.
There are two important legal issues concerning technological integration in play at this moment. The most prominent, by far, is the type of
legal standard that should be applied to technological tying. Most circuits
have held that technological tying is permissible unless it is carried
out with the sole (or, at least, overwhelming) purpose of hampering
competition, rather than to achieve some technologically beneficial
result. 13 The only exception to this general standard is the rule of reason
test of Microsoft III, which requires courts to balance technological benefits against competitive harms in cases involving software platforms.' 4
Microsoft III raises the question whether the rule of reason is generally
preferable to the sole-purpose standard in technological integration
cases.
The second unresolved issue is the standard of proof in technological
tying cases. The courts have provided two clear alternatives. Caldera,Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp. 15 requires the defendant to produce credible evidence
of a significant technological improvement.16The D.C. Circuit in Microsoft
/ 17said the defendant could satisfy its burden merely by providing a
"plausible claim" of the existence of a significant consumer benefit, 8

13See Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1330 (5th Cir.
1976) (violations should be limited to instances where the integration "has been for the
purpose of tying the products, rather than to achieve some technologically beneficial
result."); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F. 3d 935,949-50 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (reviewing
antitrust law on technological integration and concluding: "The short answer is thus that
integration may be considered genuine if it is beneficial when compared to a purchaser
combination. ... In antitrust law, from which this whole proceeding springs, the courts
have recognized the limits of their institutional competence and have on that ground
rejected theories of 'technological tying."'); see also 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST
LAw 1757c (1996). For further discussion of the law governing technological integration,
see infra Part II.A.2.
14Microsoft Il,253 F.3d at 94-95. Although the D.C. Circuit rejected the approach of
district court judge, Thomas Penfield Jackson, it adopted a test that is virtually identical
to the one articulated by Judge Jackson in his opinion. See United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 87 F. Supp.2d 30, 48-49 (D.D.C. 2000).
15Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp.2d 1295 (D. Utah 1999) (Caldera).
'6 Id. at 1325.
17United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Microsoft I).
'8 Id. at 950.
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though the court later rejected that standard in Microsoft 11119 In any
event, whether courts settle uniformly on the sole-purpose test or the
rule of reason as the substantive legal standard, the standard of proof
will play a key role in determining the full impact of the legal standard.
To date, courts have not settled on a rule governing the allocation of
proof burdens in technological tying cases.
The splintering of legal rules created by the Microsoft IXldecision casts
a cloud of uncertainty over technological integration. We will argue that
the sole-purpose test in force in the majority of circuits is the best legal
standard for technological tying, and, perhaps more controversially, the
"plausible claim" standard articulated in Microsoft II provides the proper
standard of proof for these cases. 0 We will also argue that in cases of
contractual tying the rule of reason should be applied.
Part II of this paper provides an overview of the law and literature of
tying. Since a large part of the theoretical discussion in this paper is a
critique of post-Chicago models and their implications for tying law, we
devote a substantial amount of space in Part II to a presentation of postChicago tying theory. Part III presents the decision-theory framework.
Part IV applies the decision framework to the post-Chicago literature in
order to assess the literature's implications for antitrust enforcement.
In particular, we ask in Part IV whether the post-Chicago literature has
provided a set of requirements that, when coupled with those of classical
tying doctrine, could provide a defensible set of sufficient conditions for
triggering the per se prohibition. We consider the following conditions in
the tied market: entry barriers, complementary goods, network effects,
and technologically advancing industries. We conclude that these conditions fail to provide a compelling set of sufficient conditions, and that
it is hard to avoid a rule of reason approach that considers potential
benefits as well as harms. Part V applies the decision framework to the
legal standards governing technological integration.
II. THE LAW AND LITERATURE OF TYING
A.

LAW

Tying doctrine, like tying theory, can be analyzed under classical and
post-Chicago categories. 2' Under classical doctrine the defendant's liabil19Microsoft Ill, 253 F.3d at 92 (stating that Microsoft I is limited to case of interpreting
consent decree)).
20 See infra Part V.A.

21Tying theory includes classical, Chicago, and post-Chicago categories. We refer to
only classical and post-Chicago categories of tying law because the Chicago influence, we
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ity is based on the theory that it has extended or leveraged its market
power in the tying product market to the tied product market by "forc-

23
ing" 22 consumers to purchase the tied product with the tying product.

The three essential parts of this analysis are market power, leveraging,
and forcing.2 4 We will also include within classical doctrine the case law
on product integration generated over the late-1970s and early-1980s,2 5
which articulates a far less burdensome standard for defendants. The
post-Chicago doctrinal category includes contractual tying and technological integration cases that have deviated from the standards of the
classical case law.

hope to make clear below, has largely been in the form of altering the interpretation of
classical doctrine rather than changing the doctrine itself.
22The term "forcing" is emphasized in Jefferson Parish. In the Court's opinion Justice
Stevens remarks, "Our cases have concluded that the essential characteristic of an invalid
tying arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to
force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at
all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms. When such 'forcing'
is present, competition on the merits in the market for the tied item is restrained and
the Sherman Act is violated." Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12
(1984). No court has provided a special legal definition of forcing. However, the Jefferson
Parish opinion suggests that forcing can only occur in settings in which the consumers
have few alternatives to begin with (because of the defendant's market power) and the
defendant has actively restricted their choices further by requiring them to purchase the
tied product with the tying product. Id. at 16. Jefferson Parish seems to reject the theory
that consumers can be "forced" by their own inability to engage in intelligent comparisonshopping. Id. at 27-28.
21One example of such leveraging, discussed in the case law, is price discrimination.
See Fortner Enters., Inc v. United States Steel Corp., 429 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1976) (Fortner
II) (suggesting that antitrust violation is less likely, given that tying arrangement could
not have been used as a form of price discrimination).
24 One could say that the doctrine seeks to prohibit tying when the defendant has market
power in the tying market, could use that power to gain additional power (e.g., in the
tied market), and also harm consumers. It follows that the doctrine requires plaintiffs to
present evidence of market power, consumer harm (forcing), and a credible theory of
tying as a method of monopoly extension (leveraging). We interpret the leveraging inquiry
as including the case in which tying is used to maintain a monopoly position. See Robin
Cooper Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079 (1999). The per se
tying prohibition, which makes tying unlawful when the tie-in involves separate products,
the seller has market power in the tying good, and there is substantial foreclosure in the
tied good market, Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16-21, is part of classical tying doctrine,
though not a necessary feature of it. As Justice O'Connor noted in her concurrence in
Jefferson Parish, the lines of inquiry required by classical tying analysis could be pursued
without requiring much more effort under a rule of reason test. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S.
at 33-35. What seems to be essential to the classical legal framework is the presumption
that the defendant should be found in violation of the law, in the absence of good
justification, if the classical doctrine requirements are satisfied. Consistent with this view,
the per se rule should be seen as an attempt to restrict the set of conditions under which
the presumption of illegality may be rebutted.
25For further discussion, see infra Part II.A.2.
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1. Classical Tying Doctrine
The important cases formulating classical tying doctrine are well
known to antitrust students: InternationalSalt,26 Northern Pacific,27 Fortner

II,and Jefferson Parish.28 International Salt and Northern Pacific lay the
foundations of classical tying analysis and establish the per se test currently applied by antitrust courts.
International Salt and Northern Pacific establish liberal approaches to
analyzing the existence of market power, extension, and forcing. Market
power was more or less presumed in International Salt from the fact
that the tying products-salt processing machines-were patented.2 9 In
Northern Pacific, the Court concluded the defendant had market power
in the tying product (land) because of its sizeable holdings and because
of what it described as the "strategic location" of the parcels. 30 Moreover,
the Court suggested in Northern Pacific that market power in the traditional sense required under Sherman Act Section 2 is not required by
tying doctrine; it is enough if the defendant has "sufficient economic
31
power" to restrain competition in the tied market.
The liberal approach to classical tying analysis reflected in International
Salt and Northern Pacific was taken to a questionable degree when the
Court examined the extension and forcing issues. In both cases the
defendant had included an opt-out clause allowing the consumer to
purchase the tied product from any other seller who provided it at a
26

International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).

Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936), should be named among this list of classical
theory cases. IBM is important for two reasons. First, it establishes the leverage theory as
the basis for concern under tying doctrine. Second, IBM establishes the norm under tying
doctrine that "goodwill defenses" will have to meet a very high burden. In other words,
a defendant that claims it must tie in order to maintain the quality of the bundle must
prove that quality could not be maintained through some less-restrictive alternative. This
norm has been adhered to in subsequent cases, such as InternationalSalt andJerrodElectronics
(United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1960), afjfd
per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961)). JerroldElectronics establishes an exception to the per se
rule for the case in which tying is used in order to enter into a new industry. SeeJerrold
Electronics, 187 F. Supp. at 557. Under the Jerrold Electronicsexception, courts will impose
a much lower burden on defendants who assert a goodwill defense for tying.
2 InternationalSalt, 332 U.S. at 395.
3oNorthern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 7-8.
31More specifically, NorthernPacificprovides that the per se rule applies if the defendant
has sufficient economic power in the tying market to appreciably restrain competition in the
tied product market, and a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce has been foreclosed in
the tied market. Id. at 11.
2

21
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lower price. 2 Given such a clause, one could argue that the consumer
was forced, if at all, by an extremely light hand.33 In spite of this, the
34
Court regarded the presence of an opt-out clause as irrelevant.
The Supreme Court's willingness in these cases to fudge the market
power and forcing issues in order to find the defendant's tie-in unlawful
is consistent with a proposition it announced in Standard Stations, 3 that
"tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition."3 6 While the Standard Stations proposition is questionable,
it does provide a simple theoretical premise for the Court's early tying
decisions. The later classical cases reveal efforts by the Court to qualify
and back away from the Standard Stations proposition. In these later
decisions, the Court clarified both the limits of classical tying doctrine
and of the per se test.
2. The Chicago Influence
In both Fortner II and Jefferson Parish the Court insisted on a more
rigorous notion of market power to form the basis of classical tying
doctrine. This was probably a reflection of the Chicago School's influence, though it is important to note that the Court's insistence did not
require a change in the formal doctrine. Whereas the Chicago School
led to a change in predatory pricing doctrine, 7 this has not been the
case in tying law.
In FortnerII, the Court made a conscious effort to bring tying doctrine
in line with the classical analytical requirements of market power, leveraging, and forcing. The Court held that in the absence of proof that
32 InternationalSalt,

332 U.S. at 396-97; Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 12.
is doubtful that the defendant could have included a monopoly surcharge in the
price of the tied product. Given the opt-out clause, and other evidence, Peterman suggests
that the tie in InternationalSalt probably served efficiency purposes. John L. Peterman,
The International Salt Case, 22 J.L. & ECON. 351 (1979). Since railroads have high fixed
costs, and need to maximize service in order to minimize the average cost of rail service,
the tie-in in Northern Pacific could have been designed to facilitate full or nearly full
utilization of the railroad's infrastructure. This would have benefited the railroad's consumers by lowering the price of rail service to them over time.
s InternationalSalt, 332 U.S. at 397; Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 7-8. We note that the
market for salt, the tied product in the InternationalSalt case, was probably competitive.
See Peterman, supra note 33, at 357.
15 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (Standard Stations).
33 It

36 Id. at 305.
17The

important Chicago-influenced changes in predatory pricing doctrine are reflected

in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), and Brooke Group

Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). Matsushitaand Brooke Group
impose a "recoupment" test that requires plaintiffs to show that the defendant reasonably
could have expected to recoup losses incurred in a predatory pricing campaign. For a
critique of this doctrine, as well as the Chicago theory that inspired it, see Patrick Bolton,
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U.S. Steel had a cost advantage in the tying market (credit),38 its market
share was too small to indicate the degree of tying-market power required
under the law.39 The Court also said that it would be improper to infer
unlawful tying without analyzing the price of the whole bundle in comparison to the market,0 suggesting that some indication of consumer harm
is an important component of tying analysis.
Jefferson Parish dealt with a hospital's tying of anesthesiology services
to surgery. 4' The Court concluded that the hospital did not have sufficient
economic power because it lacked market power in its geographic market,4 2 where the hospital served only 30 percent of the population.4 3 The
plaintiff argued that even though the defendant's market share was
modest, consumers could not effectively shop among anesthesiologists
because of imperfect information. 44 The Court rejected the imperfect
4
information argument as a basis for finding sufficient economic power,
and in so doing suggested that evidence of market power in the tradi46
tional Section 2 sense is necessary to find unlawful forcing.
Jefferson Parish is the Court's most vigorous effort to date to put limits
on the Standard Stations proposition and its expansive implications for
the per se rule. The Court focused on the separate-products distinction
and the forcing requirement as limiting principles. On the separateproducts question, the Court said that the tying and tied products would
be regarded as separate if there is "sufficient demand" for the tied
product "to identify a distinct product market in which it is efficient to
Joseph F. Brodley, & Michael H. Riordan, PredatoryPricing:Strategic Theory and Legal Policy,
88 GEO. L.J. 2239 (2000).
8The defendant U.S. Steel offered to finance the cost of acquiring and developing
land provided the developer agreed to purchase U.S. Steel's prefabricated homes. Fortner
II, 429 U.S. at 611.
39Id. at 620-22.
40Id. at 618.
41Any patient planning to undergo surgery at the East Jefferson Hospital had to use

the anesthesiologists on the hospital staff. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 4-5.
42 Id. at 27-29.
15Id. at 26.
11Id. at 27-28. The Court used the more general term "market imperfections," which
were caused by the fact that "the prevalence of third-party payment for health care reduces
price competition," and "a lack of adequate information renders consumers unable to
evaluate the quality of medical care provided by competing hospitals." Id. at 27.
15 Id. at 28-29.
46Such forcing, the Court stressed, requires the blocking of competition on the merits,
id. at 28, and imperfect information does not imply that the seller's tie-in has restricted
competition in the sense of forcing a purchase that would not have otherwise been made
or preventing a purchase that would have been.
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offer" the tied product separately from the tying product.4 7 On forcing,
the Court suggested that the elimination of competition on the merits
48
in the tied good is essential.
Although the Court's use of the term "efficient" in its separate-products
test has not been a major focus of the case law or literature following
Jefferson Parish,it is potentially a key consideration. 49 Of course, its importance is a function of how courts interpret the term. If it is understood
to require an examination of economic efficiency, the separate-products
standard of Jefferson Parish becomes indistinguishable from a rule of
reason inquiry. However, no court has indicated a willingness to interpret
the term in this manner, and the only court to carefully consider the
application of the term "efficient" in the separate-products test, the D.C.
50
Circuit in Microsoft III, rejected the full-blown efficiency interpretation.
If, consistent with the D.C. Circuit, we view the separate-products inquiry
as an empirical test that looks to the behavior of competitive firms,5'
specifically whether fringe competitors also engage in tying, we see immediately that the test fails to take efficiency defenses into account in two
important settings. One, noted in Microsoft III, is the case of the firstmover who ties two products that had been sold separately.52 The second
is the case in which tying is used for product differentiation purposes.
Given the likely prevalence of these cases, we think it is appropriate to
view the standard articulated by the Jefferson Parish majority as a per se
test rather than as a modified rule of reason standard.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion,joined by three otherJustices,
differed from the majority by wanting to replace the per se rule with a
rule of reason test 5 3 and by urging a wider "single product" safe harbor.
For two products to be considered as distinct, O'Connor's approach
would require that some consumers might wish to purchase the tied
product separately without also purchasing the tying product.5 4 The
O'Connor approach would call the package a single integrated product
17Id.

at 21-22.
11Id. at 12 ("the essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller's
exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of
a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase
elsewhere on different terms.").
11On the efficiency of bundling and the decision to sell products separately, seeinfra
Part III.B (example of bundling to save packaging costs).
50Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 88.
1' Id. at 87-88.
52Id. at 92-93.
53
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 33.
11Id. at 39.
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55
when the "economic advantages of joint packaging are substantial.
The separate-products test of O'Connor's opinion would create a nearper se legality exception that would have applied to the defendant hospital inJefferson Parish.Moreover, the near-per se legality rule clearly would
apply to most product integration decisions, such as the integration of
lenses into cameras, or engines into cars. As we will see shortly, this
approach would have brought contractual tying doctrine in line with
the technological integration case law developed in lower courts.

3. Technological Integration and Classical Tying Doctrine
AsJustice O'Connor'sJefferson Parishopinion suggested, tying doctrine
has implications for technological integration. If it is unlawful to package
two goods together, a seller will have an incentive to bolt the two goods
together and call it a single integrated product. Justice O'Connor's
opinion alluded to the fact that tying doctrine does create this incentive.
In general, the law provides an exception to the tying prohibition for
the case of technological integration. In other words, if we view classical
tying doctrine broadly as consisting of case law on contractual tying and
case law on technological integration, we see entirely different standards
in the two sub-fields. In the contractual tying law we have a qualified
per se illegality rule, and in the technological tying case law we have a
rule that puts such a high proof burden on plaintiffs that it seems to
presume legality.
Courts have held that in order to succeed in a technological tying claim,
a plaintiff must show that the defendant integrated the two products for
the sole purpose of hampering competition, rather than to produce
some additional utility to consumers. More specifically, the prevailing
standard is that of Response of Carolina,Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc. ,6 which
requires proof that the integration was solely "for the purpose of tying
the products, rather than to achieve some technologically beneficial
result. '5 7 For example, a car manufacturer that bolts a radio onto the
dashboard would not fall under the safe harbor of Leasco if it could be
shown that the bolting offers consumers no additional utility beyond
what they could achieve on their own by purchasing the car and a radio
separately. If the seller's integration provides no additional utility to
11Id. at 40.
-6 Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976)
(Leasco).
57Id. at 1330; see also AREEDA ET AL., supra note 13 (technological tying claim requires
proof that design or redesign of product "is 'artificial' in that it lacks a technological
advantage or purchaser utility").
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consumers, the proper inference, it would appear, is that the seller did
it for the sole purpose of harming competition.
In operation, the Leasco standard has proved to be a formidable barrier
to plaintiffs. For example, in a prominent series of cases involving IBM's
efforts to integrate the functions of various peripheral devices into and
to otherwise redesign the central processing unit-the IBMcases-courts
uniformly rejected the tying claims brought by plaintiffs.5 8 In each of
these cases, the essence of the plaintiffs claim was the same: that IBM
had excluded them from the market by redesigning the mainframe in
a way that made its products superfluous or incompatible. Courts refused
to apply the tying prohibition, generally on the ground that innovation
is too important to the competitive process to subject to judicial second-guessing. 9
The early technological integration cases introduced, or perhaps
brought into sharp relief, an especially protective approach toward product integration in classical tying doctrine. There were two motivations.
One is that an uncertain doctrine that threatens harsh penalties for
integrating products could deter innovation, an important competitive
force. 6 The other concern is that where the advantage or efficiency is
58 Cal. Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979) (directed verdict for
IBM because design changes made to product were a cost-saving effort rather than an
attempt to monopolize); Innovation Data Processing, Inc. v. IBM, 585 F. Supp. 1470, 1476
(D.NJ. 1984) (finding that IBM's integration of a "dump-restore" utility into mainframe
operating system was a lawful package of technologically interrelated components); ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 448 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Cal. 1978), (finding that disk
drives and head/disk assembly combination were lawful), affdper curiam sub nom. Memorex
Corp. v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980); In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust
Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (finding, among other things, that IBM's design
changes for the interface between the central processing units and certain peripherals
and for certain models of central processing units were not unreasonably restrictive of
competition), affid sub nom. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.
1983); Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), (denying a claim that
IBM's integration of additional memory and control functions into its central processing
unit constituted unlawful tying), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975).
19See, e.g., Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. at 306 ("In the court's view it would not
be a proper application of the antitrust laws under the circumstances shown by the
record to preclude or discourage the utilization of advancing technology by this type of
integration."). Another prominent case of integration decided on the same theory involved
Kodak's simultaneous introduction of the 110 Instamatic camera and Kodacolor II film,
requiring new equipment for development. Foremost Pro Color, Inc v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 703 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1983). Foremost, one of Kodak's competitors in the photo
finishing business, brought suit on the theory that this constituted an unlawful tying
arrangement. The court rejected Foremost's claim on the ground that "any other conclusion would unjustifiably deter the development and introduction of those new technologies
so essential to the continued progress of the economy." Id. at 542-43.
60 For an empirical evaluation of the benefits of innovation in one particular product
line, see Amil Petrin, Quantifying the Benefits of New Products: The Case of the Minivan
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in the product design itself ("integration" versus "bolting"), courts should
be especially reluctant to impose liability.
4. Post-Chicago Tying Doctrine
a. Eastman Kodak
We have described classical tying doctrine as consisting of the Supreme
Court's decisions up to Jefferson Parish and the lower court decisions on
technological integration issued in the same period. Within this set of
cases, courts have not explicitly deviated from the classical framework,
though implicit deviations have been common. Indeed, one could say
that the history of tying doctrine has been dominated by the Supreme
Court's failure to consistently apply the classical doctrinal requirements
of market power, leveraging, and forcing.
Explicit deviations from the classical framework have been rare in the
cases followingJefferson Parishas well. Of the Supreme Court's cases, only
one, Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,61 arguably falls into
this set of explicit deviations, which we call the post-Chicago category.
Consistent with the classical model, Kodak's policy-selling replacement
parts only to copy machine owners who relied on Kodak for service or
who self-serviced their equipment 6 2-could be seen as an effort to extend
its power in the parts market to the service market. However, the consistency with the classical model breaks down after this observation. The
key difficulty is that Kodak did not have market power in the original
equipment market,63 so equipment purchasers could not have been compelled to purchase the aftermarket products (parts, service) by the lack
of alternatives in the equipment market. Still, the Court concluded that
market imperfections (lack of information, switching costs) could make
it difficult for competition in the original equipment market 64to discipline
monopoly extension efforts in the after-market for service.
Since Eastman Kodak is not easily reconcilable with Jefferson Parish,
where the Court rejected the contention that market imperfections
could supplant market share analysis as a basis for finding market power,
lower courts have been forced to reconcile the two decisions. Circuit
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 8227, Apr. 2001), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w8227.
61504 U.S. 451 (1992).
62Kodak sold copying machines and provided parts and service for the machines. In
an attempt to eliminate independent service organizations, Kodak tied service to parts by
selling parts only to equipment owners who relied on Kodak for service or who self-serviced
their equipment. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 458.
63Id. at 451.
61 Id. at 477-78.
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courts have limited the holding in Eastman Kodak to the case in which
the firm changes its service policy after consumers have purchased the
65
equipment.
b. Microsoft and technological tying
Other than Eastman Kodak, the only other significant deviations from
the classical tying model have occurred in the course of the Microsoft
litigation, which involves technological tying. As we have noted, classical
tying doctrine, viewed broadly, creates a safe harbor for technological
integration-in the sense that it is very unlikely that plaintiffs will win.
The most prominent illustration of this doctrinal safe harbor is provided
by the IBMcases. The Microsoft litigation has generated two cases, Microsoft
III and Caldera, that have gone against the classical law on technological integration.
In Microsoft III, the D.C. Circuit held that "the rule of reason, rather
than per se analysis, should govern the legality of tying arrangements
involving platform software products. 66 The court rejected both the per
se analysis from the contractual tying cases relied on by the district
court, 67 and the "sole purpose" inquiry developed in Leasco and other
technological integration cases. The court noted, as did Justice O'Connor'sJefferson Parishconcurrence, that some instances of efficient integration could be penalized under the test of the Jefferson Parishmajority. 68
However, rather than adopting a test that provides a safe harbor for
these instances, as O'Connor had urged, the D.C. Circuit adopted a
balancing test that weighs consumer benefits against competitive harms.
While the D.C. Circuit seemed eager to reject per se analysis for
software platform cases, 69 the test it adopted clearly deviates from the
65Metzler v. Bear Automotive Serv. Equip. Co., 19 F. Supp.2d 1345, 1357 (S.D. Fla.
1998) (Metzler); Lee v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 23 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1994); Queen City
Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 440 (3d Cir. 1997). In particular, if a
firm that does not have market power in the original equipment market announces in
advance that it will tie service to parts, it will not be found liable for unlawful tying. Metzler,
19 F. Supp.2d at 1364-65.
6,6Microsoft II1, 253 F.3d. at 84.
67Trial court judge Thomas Penfield Jackson had held that Microsoft violated Section
1 of the Sherman Act by integrating the Internet Explorer Web browser with the Windows
operating system. Microsoft 111, 87 F. Supp.2d 30, 47-51 (D.D.C. 2000). Using the separateproducts test of the Jefferson Parishmajority, Jackson concluded that the Web browser and
the operating system were separate products. Id. at 49.
8 Microsoft Ii, 253 F.3d at 92-93.
69 Paradoxically, the rule of reason test adopted by the D.C. Circuit is virtually indistinguishable, except for the allocation of the proof burden, from the per se test adopted by
Judge Jackson. Judge Jackson's interpretation of Eastman Kodak led him to reject the
deferential proof standard of Microsoft I1,87 F. Supp.2d at 47-48, and to hold that the
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classical tying doctrine on technological integration. In particular, the
classical doctrine exhibited a protective approach toward product integration on the grounds that the risk of harsh penalties would deter
innovation and that antitrust liability should be scaled back where the
advantage or the efficiency inheres in the product's design as opposed
to its marketing. The rule of reason test violates both norms by subjecting
software platform sellers to a substantial risk of treble damages for
design choices.7"
In Caldera,71 the court considered the burden of proof in a technological tying case, and held that a tying claim must be rejected "if the evidence
shows that a valid, not insignificant, technological improvement has been
achieved by the integration of two products." 72 Although this seems
generally consistent on first impression with the classical standard on
integration, its novelty becomes clear when compared to the test suggested by the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft /, the only other case to explicitly
consider the burden of proof question. 73 In Microsoft II, the D.C. Circuit
suggested that a technological tie-in should be deemed lawful if "there
is plausible claim that the tie-in brings some advantage." 74 The standard
announced in Calderarequires credible evidence of a significanttechnological improvement, rather than the existence of a plausible claim of consumer
advantage.75 While Microsoft I/places the burden of proof almost entirely
on the plaintiff, Caldera shifts a substantial part of the burden to the
76
defendant.
In particular, the significant-technological-improvement standard differs from the plausible-benefit standard in two respects: it involves a
defendant, in order to prevail, must demonstrate procompetitive justifications sufficient
to outweigh anticompetitive effects. Id. at 48-49.
70Provided, of course, that the platform seller has sufficient market power to trigger
scrutiny under tying doctrine. For a platform seller with a small market share, the risk of
having to pay treble damages as the result of a design choice is negligible.
7' Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp.2d 1295 (D. Utah 1999).
72Id. at 1325.

73Although the D.C. Circuit limited Microsoft H in its Microsoft III opinion, the Caldera
court had interpreted Microsoft II as providing a rule regarding the standard of proof.
The Caldera court explicitly rejected the Microsoft I standard. Caldera, 72 F. Supp.2d
at 1323-25.
74Microsoft I, 147 F.3d at 950.
71Caldera, 72 F. Supp.2d at 1325-26 ("Accordingly, the technological improvements
must have demonstrated efficiencies. This is more than just a 'plausible claim that brings
some advantage.'").
76Both Calderaand Microsoft Hstate clear rules governing the allocation of proof-rules
that had not been clarified in earlier cases. Given this, one might argue that it is Microsoft
It that is the novel case rather than Caldera. As our discussion in the text suggests, we view
Calderaas the novel interpretation because Microsoft IIfollows the pattern of a substantial
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hindsight judgment and it focuses on the quality of the technological
improvement rather than the benefit to the consumer. These features
of the Caldera test threaten to penalize some of the most desirable types
of innovation. The most efficient cases of product integration will involve
easy technical combinations that provide a great deal of utility to consumers, such as the eraser/pencil combination. The Caldera standard poses
the highest risk of liability for precisely these combinations because it
places little emphasis on consumer benefits and a great emphasis on the
"validity and significance" of the technical improvement, using hindsight
to judge.
More generally, one can argue that the protective treatment technological integration gets in the classical doctrine suggests that these cases
are different in important respects from the contractual tying cases that
make up the foundation of tying law. One proposition stands at the core
of the classical tying model: competition on the merits in the tied good
is blocked when a consumer is compelled by the lack of substitutes in
the tying product market to purchase a tied product that he does not
want or would prefer to purchase from another source. However, setting
aside the convenience issue, many consumers of an integrated product
would not view the stand-alone version of the tied component as preferable or even as a perfect substitute. Of course, in the case of a mere
"bolting together," the integrated tied-product is a perfect substitute to
the stand-alone version of the same item. The technological tying case law
has incorporated this distinction by exempting from the tying prohibition
only those cases in which the integration offers some nontrivial utility
to consumers above what they could achieve on their own by combining
77
the different products.
B.

CLASSICAL AND CHICAGO THEORIES

1. Classical Tying Analysis
Classical tying doctrine developed before industrial economics and
the economic analysis of law achieved their current level of technical
sophistication.78 As a result, classical tying doctrine rests primarily on a
verbal proposition rather than one or more of the formal models used
in modern economics. The proposition was quite simple: a firm with a
line of cases (e.g., the IBM cases) articulating a deferential approach toward technological
integration decisions.
77Leasco, 537 F.2d at 1329-31.
78 The founding of the Bell Journal of Economics in 1970 roughly coincides with and may
well have been an important cause of the increased level of mathematical sophistication
underlying theory in industrial economics and law and economics.
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monopoly over one good (tying good) could monopolize another (tied
good) by selling them only in conjunction with each other. If it did so,
a firm seeking to compete in the market for the tied good would be
foreclosed from selling to all those who received the tied good in conjunction with their purchase of the tying good. Little attention was paid
initially to whether tying was an efficient way of exploiting existing
monopoly power in the tying good, or a method of creating a new
79
monopoly in the tied good.
2. The Chicago Critique
s0

Starting in the 1950s, Chicago School scholars challenged virtually
every aspect of antitrust doctrine with the exception of the per se ban on
horizontal price fixing.8' The Chicago critique of classical tying doctrine
rested on three main ideas. First, tying could provide convenience for
customers and lower transaction costs. Second, tying was an inefficient
use of monopoly power. A firm with monopoly power over one good
might have the ability to monopolize the market for another good, but
doing so could not increase profits and could reduce them. This idea
is sometimes called the "single monopoly profit" theory. Third, bundling
could result in lower prices for some customers and higher levels of
output.,,
79 SeeWard S. Bowman, TyingArrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 23-24
(1957) (noting the ambiguity of the leverage hypothesis).
8oFor early examples, see Director & Levi, supra note 1; Bowman, supra note 79.

8l Chicago School legal theorists relied on Chicago School industrial economics. For
an example of the Chicago School approach to industrial economics, see GEORGE J.
STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY (1968). Contrast it with, for example, F.M.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

(1970). The

Chicago School relied on models in which markets were assumed to be either monopolistic
or perfectly competitive. Thus, the analysis of actions, such as tying and vertical integration,
turned on whether a monopolist in one market could use these practices to extend the
monopoly to another. SeeJohn M. Vernon & Daniel A. Graham, Profitabilityof Monopolization
by Vertical Integration, 79 J. POL. ECON. 924 (1971). The Chicago School also analyzed
situations in which two products were monopolized and asked whether the coordination
of these monopolies could harm consumers. Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and
Antitrust Policy, 58J. POL. ECON. 347 (1950).
82To elaborate, there is an extensive literature on the possibility of bundling to accomplish much the same goals as price discrimination. This argument potentially applies to
a wide variety of goods in which most customers buy bundles that contain components
they do not want. Most cable subscribers have little interest in some channels included
with basic cable service. Most buyers of newspapers likely discard entire sections. Purchasers
of such goods may often feel that they are forced to buy something they do not want.
Forcing a company to sell on an unbundled basis would not, however, necessarily make
consumers better off (even if doing so did not increase transactions costs). The reason
is that the sum of the prices a company would charge for the components would exceed
the bundle price. Thus, while consumers who would buy a sufficiently small fraction of
the bundle might well be hurt, others benefit; and there is no reason to suppose that
consumers in aggregate are hurt by this practice.
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Of these three ideas, the first is the one of greatest practical importance. A moment's reflection reveals that tying is utterly ubiquitous. For
example, when a university offers its courses only to degree candidates,
it sells an integrated product. Even if it were to allow students to enroll
for individual courses, charging for a course as opposed to individual
sessions and including the cost of evaluating the student's work in the
course fee are all examples of product bundling. This example not only
illustrates that tying is common but also why it is beneficial. Suppose
universities sold separately each lecture, grading of a paper, and visit to
a professor's office. Even putting aside the difficulty of determining
prices, the cost of keeping records to implement such a system would
be enormous.
The second idea has been illustrated with examples based on the
nature of the demand for the tying and for the tied products; specifically
whether the demands are independent or complementary. The independent case is where the quantity demanded of one good would not depend
on the price of the other, if they were sold separately. In this case, tying
a competitively supplied good to a monopolistically supplied one is
equivalent to putting a tax on the supply of the monopoly good. Unless
consumers want to pay the tax-i.e., they want the tied good and it is
being sold at the competitive price-tying reduces profits. The complementary case is where the demand for each good, if they were sold
separately, would depend on the sum of the prices of the two goods. In
this case, the tying-good monopolist has no clear incentive to take over
the tied-good market. Rather than selling both goods together, it could
83
do just as well by selling the monopoly good at the monopoly price. If
a more efficient firm can sell the tied good at a lower price, the tyinggood monopolist can increase its profits by abandoning the tied-good
market and raising its price on the monopoly good.
The third idea has also been illustrated with examples, the most famous
of which is George Stigler's movie example.84 In his analysis of block
booking by movie distributors, Stigler presented a simple example that
laid the foundation for the view that tying-in the case where the firm
has a monopoly in the tied as well as the tying good-could be a beneficial

11Suppose, for example, that the widgets and gadgets both cost $1 to produce and that
the widget monopolist would charge $3 if it bundled. The firm can do just as well by
charging $2 for widgets and relying on the competitive markets to supply gadgets for $1.
" STIGLER, supranote 81, at 165-70. Another famous example is that of "metering," in

which one good is used to monitor the intensity of demand for the monopoly good. For
example, a camera monopolist might sell its camera at the competitive price and put the
monopoly surcharge into the price of film. As in Stigler's movie example, there is no
general result that tying is harmful to consumers.
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form of price discrimination. 85 In his analysis, one firm distributes two
films, X and Y. Half of all theaters are willing to pay $8,000 for movie
X and $2,500 for movie Y. The other half are willing to pay $7,000 for
movie Y and $3,000 for movie X. With unbundled sales, the distributor
would charge $8,000 for movie X and $7,000 for movie Y. Each theater
would take one of the two films, and consumer surplus (treating the
theaters as consumers) would be 0. With bundling, the distributor would
charge $10,000 for the two films together. All theaters would take both
films. The distributor's profits would go up by $2,000 per theater for
the first group and $3,000 for the second. Moreover, each of the first
type of theater would get a surplus of $500. Thus, tying would make
the distributor and some consumers better off while not harming any
86
other consumer.
While the direct efficiencies from tying are the most important part
of the Chicago critique, the other points associated with it have provided
more interesting grist for the mills of economic theorists. In particular,
the "single monopoly profit" defense has been discredited, as we will
make clear below. It is a relatively weak part of the Chicago attack,
because showing that a firm has no incentive to tie does not mean that
consumers are not hurt by tying.
More generally, two essential features of Chicago School analysis made
it susceptible to criticism from post-Chicago theorists. First, the arguments were stated entirely as theoretical arguments. Chicago School
theorists may well have developed theories that matched their casual
empiricism about the cases being brought, but the arguments they made
were not that anticompetitive tying is rare. They argued that it is fundamentally illogical-i.e., that there is no logically sound explanation for
85Since this analysis was based on a single highly stylized example, a literature developed
to explore the applicability of the findings to more general sets of assumptions. See Walter
J. Adams & Janet L. Yellen, Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, 90 Q.J. ECON.
475 (1976); Richard L. Schmalensee, GaussianDemand and Commodity Bundling, 57J. Bus.
S211 (1984); R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan & Michael D. Whinston, Multiproduct
Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlationof Values, 104 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1989); Michael
A. Salinger, A Graphical Analysis of Bundling, 68J. Bus. 85 (1995); Yannos Bakos & Eric
Brynjolfsson, Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency, 45 MGMT. Sci.
1613 (1999).
86 The result that tying increases consumer surplus is not a general result, but neither
is there any reason to suppose that tying lowers consumer welfare. Tying leads to some
inefficiencies. That is, even if someone who obtains a gadget along with a widget values
the gadget at more than the cost of production, there might be another customer that
does not purchase the bundle who values gadgets more than some of the people who
obtain them. On the other hand, the price a company charges for a bundle of goods is
typically less than the sum of the prices it would choose if it sold them separately. Thus,
people who would have purchased both goods if they were sold separately typically benefit
from bundling.
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why tying could be anticompetitive. That feature of the argument would
not necessarily make the analysis vulnerable if the theory were completely
convincing. The second key feature, however, was that the Chicago
School models did not address the situations that at least today seem to
be the most likely ones for intervention. The leveraging of monopoly
into markets that would otherwise be perfectly competitive is not an
issue. Rather, the more modern concern is the use of market power
(that might fall short of pure monopoly) to distort competition in an
otherwise oligopolistic market.
C.

POST-CHICAGO ANALYSIS

The post-Chicago analysis of tying was a response to the Chicago
literature's implication that tying should be legal per se. Every postChicago article that suggests that tying might be harmful assumes some
market power in both the tying and tied goods 87 and rules out by assumption convenience or any other benefits generally associated with tying.
1. The Whinston Article
Michael Whinston's "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion" is widely recognized as the seminal post-Chicago article on tying. 88 Whinston presents
a series of models in which he first makes assumptions in which tying
does not increase profits and then alters the assumptions slightly so that
they do.
a. The base model
Whinston considered a firm with a monopoly over two goods, one of
which was subject to potential competition. He assumed that the tied
good was produced with scale economies, which has the implication that
the market for it cannot be perfectly competitive. 89 As a result, an entrant
87Specifically, a key feature of essentially all post-Chicago analysis is a reliance on
economic models either of oligopoly or of entry deterrence.
81Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 Am. ECON. REv. 837 (1990).
89For the purposes of this article, "scale economies" means that average cost (AC) is
lower for higher levels of output. As a matter of pure arithmetic, marginal cost (MC)
must therefore be below average cost. To see this point, suppose that the total cost of
producing 1,000 units was $10,000, which would imply that the average cost is $10. If
average cost is a declining function of output, then the average cost of producing 1,001
units must be less than $10. For that to be the case, the total cost of producing 1,001
units must be less than $10,010, which would in turn mean that the marginal cost of the
1001" unit must be less than $10. Under perfect competition, price equals marginal cost.
The combination of MC < AC with scale economies cannot exist (in the long run) with
the condition that P = MC in perfect competition. Together, they imply P < AC, which
means that firms earn negative profits.
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would need to attain sufficient scale 9° to survive in the market. In the
Whinston model, tying can foreclose the entrant from enough sales to
be the difference between making entry profitable and unprofitable. In
those cases, tying can both increase profits and harm consumers.
The simplest version of the analysis goes as follows. Suppose there are
1 million potential customers. The incumbent firm, Monocorp, is initially
the only seller of two goods, widgets and gadgets. Customers value each
at $2 per unit (when there are no competing goods), and each costs $1
per unit to produce. Absent the threat of entry, Monocorp maximizes
its profits at $2 million by charging $2 for both widgets and gadgets and
selling 1 million units of each.
Now suppose that there is a potential competitor (Entcorp) in the
market for gadgets. Although it is not essential to the argument, suppose
that Entcorp's gadgets are better than Monocorp's but still cost only $1
to make. If Entcorp indeed enters, suppose that it charges $1.50 for its
gadgets and that, because of its quality disadvantage, Monocorp would
rationally reduce its price to $1.25. Suppose furthermore that the quality
difference is such that 666,667 people buy Entcorp's gadgets despite the
higher price whereas only 333,333 buy Monocorp's.9 ' Thus, Entcorp
earns $333,333 gross of entry costs and Monocorp's profits are reduced
to $1,083,333 (of which $1 million is from the sale of widgets).
Whinston considers whether Monocorp would find it profitable to
bundle the monopolized good with its competitive good. On the surface,
the bundling strategy seems like a device to force customers to buy the
inferior gadgets in order to get widgets. Upon further examination,
however, the desirability of the strategy is not obvious at all. Entcorp's
customers get no surplus from the $2 they pay for an unbundled widget.
Since they prefer Entcorp's gadgets at $1.50 to Monocorp's at $1.25,
they would not rationally pay $3.25 for the bundle of a gadget and a
Monocorp widget. The consequence of the bundling strategy with the
$3.25 price is simply to pass up the sale of 666,667 widgets. Consistent
with Chicago School analysis, this model suggests that the efficient way
to exploit the monopoly over widgets is through the pricing of widgets
and that the monopolist only ends up hurting itself by trying to force
unwanted gadgets on its widget customers.
90In virtually all markets, there are scale economies up to some level of output and, as
a result, entrants must attain sufficient scale to survive. When efficient scale is small relative
to the total market output, a market can be perfectly competitive (or at least nearly so).
Scale economies make a market naturally monopolistic or oligopolistic when the scale
economies are large relative to the market, in which case at most a small number of
efficient firms can co-exist.
'1 Whinston, supra note 88, § I Ex. 2.
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One might suspect that Monocorp could get the benefits of bundling
while avoiding the cost by selling unbundled widgets for $2 in addition
to the bundle of widgets and gadgets for $3.25. While doing so would
indeed prevent Monocorp from losing any sales of widgets, it would
confer no strategic advantage to Monocorp over a strategy of unbundled
sales. With widgets priced at $2 and a widget-gadget bundle priced at
$3.25, Monocorp is effectively selling gadgets for $1.25.92
If Monocorp does sell widgets and gadgets only as bundles, then, as
Whinston demonstrated, it would rationally charge less than $3.25. Of
course, the price that Entcorp charges depends on Monocorp's price,
and a reduction in the price of the Monocorp's bundle below $3.25
would have the predictable consequence of inducing Entcorp to charge
less than $1.50. Given the precise assumptions Whinston makes about
the oligopolistic interaction between the two firms, Monocorp charges
$2.58 for the bundle while Entcorp charges only $1.17 for its gadgets.
At these prices, demand for the Monocorp's bundle is 777,778 and
demand for Entcorp's gadgets is only 222,222. Monocorp's profits are
$453,704 while Entcorp's profits gross of entry costs drop to $37,037.
Note that Monocorp's profits, while greater than they would be at a
bundle price of $3.25, are less than when it sells its products unbundled
(or when it sells widgets separately from the bundle).
The crucial last step in Whinston's analysis is to consider Entcorp's
cost of entry. Suppose that the cost of entry is $100,000, which is between
the $37,037 gross profits that Entcorp can make when Monocorp bundles
and the $333,333 gross profits it can make when Monocorp does not.
In that event, the Monocorp decision to bundle is the difference between
making entry profitable or unprofitable for Entcorp. Moreover, if Entcorp stays out, then Monocorp does not even have to cut the bundle
price. In the example here, it can raise the bundle price to $4 and earn
93
$2 million, the same as it would earn if it was immune from entry.
92This

argument rests on the assumption that everyone buys a widget at a price of $2.

93For an extended analysis, see Barry Nalebuff, Bundling (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working

Paper No. 99-14, Nov. 22, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper
.cfm?abstract-id=1 85193. Nalebuff examines two reasons for tying and the interrelationship
between them. The first is that even a monopolist over two products might have an
incentive to bundle them even if there is no threat of entry. The incentive to do so
depends on the correlation of reservation values across customers, the marginal cost of
the goods, and the extent to which bundling itself saves costs. The second is that bundling
two products might make it difficult to enter with just one. This effect is related to one
of the traditional concerns about vertical integration, which is that it makes entry more
difficult by making it impossible to enter at just one stage. The relationship between the
two is that bundling can be a relatively inexpensive form of entry deterrence.
Suppose a company has a monopoly over widgets and gadgets and that the monopoly
price for each is $2. Depending on the marginal cost of production and the correlation
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The situation Whinston analyzed falls into a more general class in
which an incumbent in a market with scale economies wants to deter
an entrant. Analysis of this problem dates back at least to Bain's seminal
work, Barriers to New Competition.94 Bain suggested that a firm would
expand production beyond monopoly levels to the point where entry at
any scale would drive the price below an entrant's average cost, thus
ensuring that the entrant would lose money. 95 A criticism of the model
is that the price reduction after entry would make the market unprofitable for the incumbent as well (and on a larger scale than for the
entrant) .96 According to this critique, the incumbent would rationally
cut its output once entry occurred to increase its own profits; and the
potential entrant would choose to enter based on the expectation that
the incumbent would follow its self-interest. Using the terminology of
game theory, the incumbent's threat to let the price drop after entry to
97
non-remunerative levels is not credible.
While it is now widely accepted that the Bain model was not fully
worked out, there have been modern extensions that suggest that an
incumbent might be able to deter entry. Dixit showed that while scale
economies alone are not an entry barrier, the combination of scale
economies and sunk costs could be. 98 In its simplest form, the Bain
model considers the actions of a monopolist faced with a single potential
entrant. In practice, one would expect multiple potential entrants; and
of reservation values, it might be able to earn more money by selling them only as a
bundle and charging, say, $3.50. Moreover, the company might not be able to charge $2
each selling the goods separately because it might face entry. If so (and if it cannot deter
entry by threatening to cut its price once entry occurs), it cannot get the full monopoly
price. With bundling, however, it might be able to get the full $3.50 because entry is less
of a threat. Without bundling, an entrant into the widget market can capture the entire
market simply by offering a lower price. With bundling, people who value gadgets will
get widgets in their bundle. This limits the potential market for a widget producer and,
given Nalebuff's assumption of increasing returns to scale, makes it possible that a wouldbe widget competitor cannot enter profitably.
In the Nalebuff analysis, it is not clear that tying is harmful. He primarily examines
cases in which tying, in the absence of the threat of entry, would be beneficial. His
observation is that it might also have the side benefit of deterring entry. Given that his
assumptions are somewhat unconventional, some will question his conclusions. Even if
they are correct, however, they are points about corporate strategy. By themselves, at least,
they do not justify any limitation on tying.
4
9 JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956).
91For a recent exposition of what is known as the "Bain limit pricing model," see Richard
J. Gilbert, Mobility Barriers and the Value of Incumbency, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 475, 480 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
96Id. at 485.
17 Reinhart Selten, Reexamination of the Perfectness Conceptfor EquilibriumPoints in Extensive
Games, 4 INT'LJ. GAME THEORY 25 (1975).
"IAvinash Dixit, The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence,90 EcoN. J. 95 (1980).
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one would generally expect that a firm might have an incentive to behave
aggressively toward one in order to establish a reputation with the
others.99
In the Whinston model tying is theoretically a device for committing
to a low price for gadgets once entry occurs, thus making the threat of
such a price credible. The foregoing alternative explanations (sunk costs,
multiple entrants) for why Monocorp might respond aggressively to entry
are ruled out in his model.
b. Complementary Products
In his analysis of tying of complementary goods, Whinston modified
Chicago School assumptions to allow for the possibility of a competitor,
albeit an inefficient one, in the sale of the tying good. Under Chicago
School theory, a monopoly over one of a pair of perfectly complementary
products is as good as having a monopoly over both. If so, competition
in the sale of one of the components does not harm (and, indeed, can
help) the monopolist because it provides an opportunity to raise the
price of the other. Whinston showed, however, that potential competition
in the sale of the (potentially) tying good limits the firm's ability to get
all available profits from the sale of that good and provides an incentive
to use tying to preserve its monopoly over the tied good.
Consider, for example, computers and monitors, and suppose that
everyone with a computer uses exactly one monitor. Assume that a
computer costs $300 to produce and a monitor costs $200. Since consumers demand computers and monitors only in combination, the demand
for the two depends on the sum of the prices. If one firm had a monopoly
over both computers and monitors, therefore, it would need to determine
the profit-maximizing sum of the two prices. It could then allocate that
sum between the two components any way it chose. Suppose that the
profit-maximizing sum is $2,000, and that the seller divided that into
$1,400 for the computer and $600 for the monitor. The firm's profits
would then be $1,500 per system sold.
Now suppose that Entcorp can sell monitors, and either that it has
lower production cost per monitor or that some people prefer a system
with a Monocorp computer and an Entcorp monitor to one supplied
entirely by Monocorp. Surprising as it might seem (at least to those not
familiar with Chicago School analysis), Monocorp benefits from this,
provided it raises the price for the computer to $1,801 and lowers its
price on monitors to $199. This strategy keeps the system price the same
9 See Gilbert, supra ndte 95, at 515.
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(thus preserving both the quantity of computers sold and the profit per
computer) but realizes all of the profits in the monopoly component.
That way, the company is not hurt (and indeed receives a small benefit)
when customers buy a Monocorp computer to use with an Entcorp
monitor. This example illustrates the single-monopoly-profit theory.
As Whinston demonstrates, however, the single-monopoly-profit theory is fragile. With a slight change in assumptions, Monocorp does have
an incentive to tie in order to keep Entcorp out of the market. The
argument that Monocorp is not harmed by entry into the production
of monitors rests on the assumption that Monocorp is a true monopolist
in the production of computers. Suppose, however, that there is a firm
(Schlockcorp) that produces competing but inferior computers. To keep
matters simple, suppose that Schlockcorp's cost per computer is $300, the
same as Monocorp's. Yet everyone considers a system with a Schlockcorp
computer to be worth $100 less than a system with a Monocorp computer.
Absent Entcorp, Schlockcorp poses no problem for Monocorp. It can
keep Schlockcorp out by charging $350 for computers and $1,650 for
monitors. Its system price would still be $2,000. The strategy excludes
Schlockcorp because the minimum price Schlockcorp can profitably
charge is $300 per computer and no one would pay that price when
Monocorp computers are available for $350. As noted above, absent
Schlockcorp, Entcorp's entry does not threaten (and indeed even helps)
Monocorp. The combination of the two, however, is a problem. In order
not to be harmed by Entcorp, Monocorp must be able to raise the
price of its computers to $1,801. The presence of Schlockcorp, however,
prevents Monocorp from charging anything more than $400 for its
computers.100

Finally, even if Schlockcorp does not exist, Whinston observes that
the argument that Monocorp necessarily benefits from Entcorp's entry
rests on the assumption that monitors are purchased only in conjunction
with computers. If there is another use of monitors, however, then there
might be an incentive to tie for much the same rationale that arises
in Whinston's core model (in which goods are not complements). If
Entcorp's monitors did not exist, then Monocorp could choose the price
for its monitors that maximizes its profits in the market for the alternative
use. Suppose that price is $600. It could then charge $1,400 for a computer to achieve the desired price of a computer/monitor system. Were
110Put another way, competition from one component does not constrain the system

price. With competition in all components, however, a consumer can assemble an entire
system that contains no element produced by Monocorp. The competing system (or

systems) constrains the price that Monocorp can charge for a system.
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Entcorp to come into the market and force it to lower its monitor price,
Monocorp's profits in the sale of monitors for the alternative use would
drop. Indeed, Entcorp's entry would hurt Monocorp even if no one
desired Entcorp's monitors for the alternative use. 0 1 Of course, if some
people did buy Entcorp's monitors for the alternative use, the damage
to Monocorp would be even greater.
Under these circumstances, selling computers only in packages with
monitors can be an effective strategy. First of all, it would preserve
Monocorp's profits in selling computers. Second, the strategy would
deny Entcorp any profits from selling monitors for sales in computer
systems. To the extent that such profits are necessary to cover the fixed
costs of entry, the strategy could prevent Entcorp from entering the
market.
2. Carlton and Waldman
Carlton and Waldman extend the Whinston analysis to include assumptions that they claim more nearly fit the government's theories in the
Microsoft case. 1 2 A key issue in that litigation is what distinguishes the
integration of Internet Explorer into Windows from other features Microsoft has bundled into Windows without raising antitrust objections. The
Carlton and Waldman analysis considers two such features: the possibility
that a complementary good might at some point in the future become
a substitute, and the presence of network externalities. Their analysis
formalizes the claim that anticompetitive tying could occur in industries
with these features.
Carlton and Waldman first consider sellers of systems of two components, a primary good and a complementary good. The primary good
can be used by itself, while the complementary good can be used only
in conjunction with the primary good. One firm is initially a monopolist
in both. A firm with a superior complementary good has the opportunity
to enter. It cannot enter the market for the primary good at the same
time, but it has the prospect of doing so at some point down the line.
This possibility of the entrant also producing the primary good serves
the same role in the Carlton-Waldman analysis as the potential entrant
in the tying good in Whinston's complementary goods model. Without
that possibility, the monopolist would benefit from entry by a superior
complementary product. Once the entrant can sell the primary good as
101
This assertion is based on the assumption that Monocorp cannot charge different
prices for monitors depending on whether they are used as a part of a computer system.
102Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and
Create Market Power in Evolving Industries (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 6831, Dec. 1998), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6831/.
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well, the monopolist cannot hope to reap the gains from improvement
in the complementary good by raising the price of the primary good.
Carlton and Waldman also construct a model in which there are two
complementary goods and one is subject to network externalities. 0 3 As
in their first model, one firm is initially able to enter with one good (the
one with network externalities) but it cannot enter with the other (the
one that is complementary to the good with network externalities) until
later. In the Carlton-Waldman model, the presence of network externalities gives the monopolist an incentive to get a headstart in the race to
be the standard by tying. Absent the threat of entry in the primary good,
the firm would have no incentive to seek this advantage. It would prefer
to have competition to be the standard in the complementary product
result in adoption of the best available standard. It could then realize
the benefits of that standard through its price for the primary good.
Once entry into the primary good becomes possible, however, the firm
can no longer try to extract all the available rents through that good.
3. Farrell and Katz
The competitive effects of tying are related to the competitive effects
of integration because a firm with market power over one product can
only tie it to another product by producing a second product. Farrell
and Katz do not address directly the question of tying, but they do
analyze the competitive effects of integration. In particular, they examine
the effect of integration on incentives to innovate. 104
The Farrell-Katz model analyzes a market in which consumers buy a
system of two components (e.g., computers and printers). Only one
company produces computers. It can choose to produce printers as well,
but there are many potential suppliers of printers. Consumers place no
value on a computer alone or a printer alone. They always buy exactly
one printer per computer.
In the Farrell-Katz model, printer producers not only compete in the
price they charge, but also in research and development (R&D) to
improve the printers. As was the case in the Whinston model, computer
producers benefit from improvements in the price/quality profiles of
printers. A printer producer benefits from R&D if it develops a product
that is superior to its competitor's. If so, it can charge a price premium
101Network externalities are benefits consumers enjoy because a product is used widely,
such as a software product that facilitates file sharing. For discussions of network effects
and antitrust law, see David A. Balto, Networks and Exclusivity: Antitrust Analysis to Promote
Network Competition, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 523 (1999); Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network
Industries,
7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673 (1999).
14
0 joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in
Systems Markets (Jan. 4, 2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
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that fully reflects the difference between its quality and its competitor's.
To get some sense of the model's results, suppose that two firms initially
sell the same quality printer and then only one of them innovates. Given
the stark assumptions of the model, the innovating firm gets all of the
benefits from the R&D (in the form of a higher price), leaving none of
the surplus for consumers or the computer producer. In contrast, if
both firms improve their quality by the same amount, price competition
between them eliminates any benefit to them. 05
Farrell and Katz show that in their model, the computer manufacturer
would spend more on R&D if it integrated into printers than would a
stand-alone printer producer." 6 This effect might initially appear to be
procompetitive, since the merged entity competes more aggressively.
Farrell and Katz interpret it as being anticompetitive, however, in part
because it lowers the R&D by independent firms and in part because
the integrated firm's R&D exceeds the socially optimal level.
In evaluating the practical implications of the Farrell-Katz arguments,
three points are worth considering. First, the criterion they use is controversial. While it is theoretically possible for competition to be harmful,
it is not clear that harmful competition is anticompetitive. 0 7 Second, the
result that independent firms lower their R&D in response to increases
by the integrated firm is not a general result.18 Third, the incentives
for R&D are almost never socially efficient. 0 9 Under a wide variety of
105They cannot raise their price. The quantity they sell goes up, but they get no benefit
because they are charging a price that just covers their marginal cost.
106A firm's optimal expenditure on R&D turns on a weighing of the marginal benefit
and the marginal cost. Marginal cost does not depend on whether the firm is integrated.
The integrated firm does get a greater marginal benefit from innovation because R&D
expenditures by printer producers can benefit computer producers. The integrated firm
captures this latter benefit whereas an independent printer producer does not.
07To illustrate this point with a numerical example, suppose that each printer firm
would spend $100 million on R&D if each remained unintegrated. Now suppose that one
of the firms integrates into computers and, because it internalizes the effects of printer
improvements on computer sales, increases its R&D budget to $150 million. The issue is
whether that increase should be understood as procompetitive or anticompetitive. The
position implicitly endorsed by Farrell and Katz is whether it is anticompetitive depends
on whether it passes (or at least does not fail) a social welfare test. Before adopting such
a standard, courts should consider how the welfare analysis would be conducted. Real
settings would inevitably be (much) more complicated than the stylized settings of the
models; and, because both expert and judicial error would be distinct possibilities, issues
such as the burdens and standards of proof should properly depend on assessments of
the relative frequency of procompetitive and anticompetitive R&D.
"I To continue with the numerical example from the previous note, competing printer
producers could conceivably lower their R&D on the grounds that competing with the
integrated firm's higher spending would not be worth the chase. Another possibility,
though, is that they would increase their R&D in order to produce printers that would
be able to compete successfully with those of the integrated firm.
109See TxIoLE, supra note 11, at 389-401.
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circumstances, firms are not able to appropriate the full benefits from
their R&D. 10° Thus, even if one accepts social welfare as the appropriate
criterion, the result that integration creates incentives to perform too
much R&D is unlikely to be general.
Like the Whinston paper, the Farrell and Katz paper is an example
of what Franklin M. Fisher has labeled "exemplifying theory.""' The
anticompetitive phenomenon Farrell and Katz model may well occur.
That is, in industries with complementary goods, widgets and gadgets,
which both can be monopolized, the widget monopolist may invest in
the ability to produce gadgets simply as a bargaining tool; and such
investment may be socially wasteful. Moreover, recognizing that the widget monopolist may pursue this strategy, independent gadget producer
may limit their own investment. But it also possible that the widget
monopolist might really want to produce a better gadget in part to
stimulate widget sales. It is hard to see how the highly stylized assumptions
in the Farrell and Katz model could be used to assess which is more likely.
4. PreliminaryAssessment
As we noted earlier, the post-Chicago literature arose in response to
the Chicago School's implication that tying should be legal per se. The
post-Chicago models indicate that tying can be anticompetitive, not that
it must be anticompetitive or that it is likely to be anticompetitive. Indeed,
the models cannot tell us even that anticompetitive tying is more than
a remote possibility. For example, in Whinston's models, what makes
tying anticompetitive is that it denies a supplier of the tied good the
scale necessary to survive. This mechanism can work only when scale
economies in the tied good are large enough relative to the market that
the practice of tying makes the difference between achieving or not
achieving adequate scale. When cost and demand are configured so that
this condition is not satisfied," 2 anticompetitive tying is not a profitable
strategy, even under the assumptions of the model, which rule out tying
for beneficial reasons.
The primary contribution of the post-Chicago analysis is the demonstration that the single-monopoly-profit theory rests on very strong
assumptions. That theory is not, however, the primary reason to question
legal hostility to tying. Rather, the primary reason is that the prevalence
of tying in competitive markets indicates that it often provides the eco110Id.
"' Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND J. EcoN.
113 (1989).
112And even if the cost/demand condition is satisfied in one time period, it may not

be satisfied in the next in an expanding market. Thus, a firm that is deterred from entering
in period 1 need only delay its entry until period 2, when the market is larger.
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nomic benefits of providing convenience and lowering costs. The challenge for policy is to find rules that weigh these competing explanations
appropriately.
III. A DECISION-THEORETIC APPROACH
The ultimate objective in formulating tying doctrine is to outlaw tying
or product integration that lowers consumer surplus (or, alternatively,
economic welfare) and allow tying or product integration that does not.
As a practical matter, however, courts must rely on inherently imperfect
tests. Decision theory provides a powerful framework for understanding
situations in which choices among alternative actions must be based on
imperfect information. It helps us understand the tradeoffs between, in
effect, convicting the innocent and absolving the guilty.
As we will see, decision theory makes clear that a rational legal standard
for tying must come to grips with the utter ubiquity of the practice.
When a law firm offers legal services, it offers the services of its partners
only in conjunction with the services of its associates, paralegals, and
secretaries. Clients cannot pick a partner from one firm, a paralegal
from another, and a secretary from a third. While some clients with strong
preferences for particular paralegals or secretaries might conceivably be
harmed by this bundling, most clients benefit from the convenience it
provides. This example is one of a virtually infinite number of possibilities. As Carlton and Perloff have put it, "In the extreme, every product
can be thought of as composed of multiple products."' 1 3 Decision theory
implies that the ubiquity of benign tying affects how aggressive the law
should be in trying to prevent harmful tying.
A.

DECISION-THEORY FRAMEWORK

Under the decision-theory framework, a legal rule divides cases into
two categories: those that are legal under the rule and those that are
illegal. Because the rule is inherently imperfect, this categorization is
not identical to the distinction between the cases that are harmful and
benign. Thus, one can further categorize cases according to whether
the practices found legal or illegal are harmful or not. This leads to the
l1 4
following cross- classification scheme:

"' DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
466 (1990). For the observation that tying is ubiquitous, see also LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN,
ANTITRUST 443 (1977).

114
The matrix need not be 2 x 2. There can be different gradations of harmful and
different gradations of illegal.
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Harmful

Not Harmful

Illegal

% of cases that both are harmful
and violate the legal standard

Legal

% of cases that are harmful even
though they do not violate the
legal standard

% of cases that violate the legal
standard even though they are
not harmful
% of cases that are both benign
and legal under the standard

In this matrix, the upper left and lower right-hand cells represent cases
that the legal standard judges appropriately, while the upper right and
lower-left hand cells are those in which the legal standard is in error.
There are two distinct types of errors that the legal standard can make,
false "convictions"" 5 and false "acquittals."" 6 Under a decision-theoretic
approach, the basis for comparing two standards is their respective rates
of these two types of errors.
Suppose that courts are comparing two rules, A and B, whose properties
7
are represented by the following matrices."
Rule A

Illegal
Legal

Harmful

Not Harmful

20%
10%

5%
65%

Rule B

Illegal
Legal

Harmful

Not Harmful

10%
20%

1%
69%

"5 It is important to be clear, though, that a false conviction does not necessarily mean
that a trial would actually occur and result in a conviction. Included in false convictions are
benign occurrences that do not occur because of the belief that they could be challenged in
court. Indeed, some false convictions might entail cases that would not be found in
violation of the law if they went to trial but which nonetheless do not occur because of
uncertainty about the law or courts' enforcement of it.
6
1 The terms that are more commonly used in decision theory for the two possible types
of errors are "false negatives" and "false positives." Here, we adopt the terminology used
in C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67
ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999).
117Because the percentage of harmful and benign cases is not a function of the legal
rule, the sums of the respective columns in the two tables are the same. In this particular
case, 30% of the cases are harmful and 70% are not. In contrast, the fraction of cases
that are legal is not constant. Under Rule A, 25% of cases violate the rule whereas only
11% violate Rule B.
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Rule A is the stricter rule. Of the instances of the practice in question,
25% are illegal as opposed to 11% under rule B. The stricter standard
is a mixed blessing. Fewer harmful instances escape legal sanction, but
more benign instances get penalized. Precisely this sort of mixed blessing,
coupled with a reduction in administrative costs, has been the traditional
argument for preferring per se analysis to the rule of reason standard
in antitrust. l18
In order to choose between Rules A and B, courts must assess the cost
of each type of error. Assuming administrative costs for the rules are
the same, the best rule minimizes the total costs of error. For example,
if a court decided that false acquittals and false convictions were equally
costly, then it would opt for Rule A, which has the lower combined error
rate. If, however, it views a false conviction as being three times as costly
as a false acquittal, then it would opt for Rule B.
Let's apply this "rule matrix" framework to tying. Given that tying is
ubiquitous (e.g., cameras and lenses) and that under any sensible legal
standard the vast majority of instances of tying are legal, any representation of a legal rule on tying and product integration will necessarily have
a very high number in the lower right hand corner of the rule matrix.
Suppose, for example, that only 0.1% of all instances of bundling are
anticompetitive. Furthermore, suppose that under rule of reason analysis
courts can always identify harmful cases as being illegal and that they
judge 98% of benign cases to be legal. Most people's reaction to this
set of assumptions is that the judgment of the courts is highly accurate.
Given these assumptions, the rule matrix is:
Outcome Rates under Rule of

Reason for Tying
Harmful

Illegal

0.1%

Legal

0%

Not Harmful

1.96%
97.94%

In this matrix, 99.9% of all instances of bundling are not harmful." 9
However, as can be seen in the table, 95.1% of the instances of bundling
11 See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
119Since only 0.1% of instances of bundling are harmful, it follows that 99.9% are not.
In the table, the sum of the percentages under "Harmful" is 0.1% and the sum of the
two cells under "Not Harmful" is 99.9%. Note also that the ratio 97.94/99.9 is roughly
equal to 98 percent-which is the fraction of benign cases judged to be legal.
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found to be illegal under this rule are benign. 120 In other words, even
though the proposed rule of reason standard for tying is highly accurate
in the eyes of most observers, the vast majority of convictions under the
standard are false. This is a general result that is observed whenever the
relevant base rate probability--in this case, the fraction of instances in
which tying is harmful-is low. As we will see below, this has important
implications for the design of the appropriate legal standard for tying.
We have referred to the importance of the relative costs of false
convictions and false acquittals in determining the appropriate legal
standard. It is easy to demonstrate that the imposition of a relatively
accurate test may not be desirable if false conviction costs are large
relative to false acquittal costs. To take a concrete and striking example,
consider an AIDS test that, like our tying test above, judges 98% of
uninfected cases to be uninfected, and 100% of infected cases to be
infected. If used in a population in which only 0.1% is infected, the test
will have an outcome similar to that shown in the matrix: 95% of cases
that the test reports as infected will be uninfected. If the cost of a false
positive from an AIDS test is sufficiently high, one could easily generate
a scenario in which members of the tested population are better off
either not taking the test or taking it only under carefully controlled
circumstances.
There are several criticisms one might levy against the numerical
example of tying that we have put forward as a plausible case. One is to
observe that our low estimate of the base rate probability of harm (0.1%)
is subjective. We have two responses. First, in forming our subjective
estimate, we assumed that because of the ubiquity of tying to provide
convenience or lower transaction costs, the vast majority of ties are
procompetitive. Even if some anticompetitive tying occurs, it is at most
a tiny percentage of all ties. Second, the charge that our numerical
example should be discounted because the estimates are subjective misses
a key point about the application of decision theory to legal doctrine.
Decision-theoretic concepts have always been implicit in many aspects
of legal doctrine. The value of making the analysis explicit is that it lays
bare the assumptions that underlie any particular doctrine.
A more sophisticated critique would be that despite the so-called per
se rule against tying, very few instances of tying in fact run afoul of the
law. Since the fraction of false convictions cannot exceed the fraction
of convictions, one might ask, how can we be sure that the rate of error
120 This follows from applying Bayes's Theorem: note that 95.1% = 1.96% divided by
(0.1% + 1.96%). For a discussion of Bayes's Theorem, see ROBERT D. MASON ET AL.,
STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES IN BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 163-64 (10th ed. 1999).
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against defendants is an order of magnitude greater than the rate of
truly harmful cases, rather than the reverse? We concede that the de
facto antitrust treatment of tying is not nearly as hostile as the nominal
legal standards would lead one to believe. But that observation does not
refute what we consider to be the key insight of our approach. Given
the ubiquity of beneficial tying, a rational legal rule must have virtually
no risk of a false conviction. In our example, courts would have to have
a less than a 1-in-1000 chance of labeling a beneficial tie as anticompetitive to have more false convictions than true convictions and only a
1-in-10,000 chance of this type of error for 90% of convictions to be
anticompetitive. Thus, one cannot defend the current legal regime on
the ground that it is not really as hostile to tying as it might initially
appear. Rather, one needs to assert that it is nearly perfect. In the absence
of a clearly articulated standard that distinguishes beneficial from harmful tying, we see no reason to presume that the small number of cases
that do run afoul of the law are the harmful ones. If, as we contend,
most examples of ties are beneficial, then an appropriate legal test would
be accompanied by a tough standard for what constitutes an illegal tie
and would place the burden of proof on plaintiffs to establish that the
standard is met.
B.

SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR TYING LAW
AND EARLY LITERATURE

We can apply this framework to identify some of the implicit assumptions underlying alternative legal standards for tying. To simplify, we will
treat the per se illegality rule, for the moment, as if it were a categorical
prohibition of tying by firms with market power in the tying good. This
is inaccurate, given that our earlier description of the per se rule notes
that it includes proxies for rule of reason considerations. However, this
is sufficient for the crude distinctions we wish to make below.
Decision theory implies that the best legal rule minimizes the overall
expected costs of error. The three important factors suggested by the
analysis are the base rate probability of harm, the ratio of the false
conviction to the false acquittal probability (relative error rates), and
the ratio of the false conviction to the false acquittal cost (relative error
costs). The expected cost of a particular type of error-say, of a false
acquittal-is simply the product of the false acquittal rate and the cost
of a false acquittal, where the false acquittal rate is a function of the
base rate probability of harm. It follows that the per se legality rule is
more desirable as the expected cost of a false conviction increases relative
to that of a false acquittal, which, in turn, is more likely as either the
probability or the cost of a false conviction increases. Thus, holding the
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base rate probability of harm fixed, as courts have greater difficulty in
distinguishing harmful from benign instances of tying, and as the cost
of mistaking benign instances for harmful instances increases, the case
for adopting a per se legality rule gets stronger. Similarly, as the expected
cost of a false acquittal rises relative to that of a false conviction, the
case for the per se illegality rule gets stronger.
If we restrict our attention to relative error costs, it is easy to see the
case-specific factors that influence the choice of an optimal legal standard. Other things equal, false acquittal costs are likely to be small relative
to false conviction costs when there are (1) market constraints, such as
competition or entry, on the firm's conduct, (2) strategies other than
tying that the firm could use to gain the same advantage in the market,
or (3) no clear incentive to use tying for the sole purpose of harming
consumers. False conviction costs are likely to be relatively large when
there are substantial potential efficiencies associated with tying.
A few examples can be used to illustrate these factors. Market constraints are most obvious in the instances where the tying firm does not
have market power in the tying product. For example, when a firm sells
widgets and gadgets only in combination, the concern is that someone
who wants a widget but not a gadget is forced to buy a gadget. If, however,
other firms sell widgets separately (so that the seller has no market power
in widgets), then there cannot be any sense in which the bundling forces
an unwanted gadget on someone.
There are plenty of instances of tying in which one cannot reasonably
argue that the seller's only plausible objective is to restrict competition.
Goods are often sold together in competitive markets when the joint
selling either saves cost or provides convenience. Indeed, even a monopolist has an incentive to cut costs and provide convenience. Suppose for
example that 80% of the purchasers of widgets also want gadgets, that
gadgets cost $1 to produce, and that the incremental cost of packaging
gadgets separately from widgets is $0.30. In this example, it is cheaper
to provide a gadget for those who do not want it (a cost of $1 per
customer for 20% of the customers) than it is to package the goods
separately ($0.30 per customer for 80% of the customers). Customers
who want both widgets and gadgets are likely to get a lower price than
they would if the company were forced to sell the goods separately.1 21
121The case of the widget monopolist who can cut its packaging costs by tying gadgets
also reveals ways in which market constraints reduce the relative cost of false acquittals.
The Chicago School literature has shown that the likelihood of anticompetitive harm is
extremely small when the market for the tied good is competitive, so we need only consider
the case where the market for the tied good is susceptible to monopolization. Even in
this case, competitive pressures constrain the relative frequencies of harmful and beneficial
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Those who do not want gadgets would likely end up paying more for
the bundle than they would just for a widget (under unbundled sales).
Thus, they are "forced" to buy gadgets, and the 20% is presumably large
22
enough to be considered substantial foreclosure.
It is straightforward to see the implications of this perspective for the
classical and Chicago theories. Recall that the classical theory assumes
that tying is used by the seller as a monopoly leveraging mechanism.
The classical theory provides ajustification, on decision-theory grounds,
for the limitation that the seller must have market power in the tying
good. However, because even monopolists have incentives to cut costs
and provide convenience to consumers, a per se rule against tying whenever the seller has market power creates a substantial risk of false convictions because it outlaws tying for beneficial reasons. Even though classical
theory justifies a per se legality rule for instances in which the seller
does not have market power in the tying good, it does not justify a per
se illegality rule for those instances in which the seller has market power.
In order to use classical theory tojustify the per se prohibition, one must
assume that expected false conviction costs are essentially zero.
Now consider the Chicago School through the lens of decision theory.
Recall that the Chicago School analysis suggested a radical departure
from classical tying theory. The Chicago School critique suggested that
because there was no logically sound explanation for why tying could
be anticompetitive, the appropriate legal doctrine was per se legality.
Such a rule would create no risk of false acquittals, and any stricter rule
would run a risk of false convictions. False-acquittal costs are assumed
to be zero under the Chicago analysis because the Chicago School could
find no plausible basis in microeconomic theory for the anticompetitive
view of tying. False-conviction costs, on the other hand, are assumed to
be substantial under the Chicago analysis because the Chicago School
found many ways in which tying could be efficient.
tying. If the savings that result from bundling are sufficiently large, they may so far outweigh
any losses due to competitive barriers that all consumers are better off under the tie-in.
In the mixed case where some consumers gain and others lose, this may not be the case.
Still, given the likelihood that entry will be encouraged where consumers are harmed,
one should expect that most cases of bundling observed in the market will be those in
which the typical consumer is better off on net.
122The principle of allowing tying in cases when it would arise in a competitive market
underlies the test proposed by Ordover and Willig. For a discussion of the general principle,
see Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation:Pricing and
Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981). For a discussion of how the principle relates to
tying in technologically advanced markets such as computer software, seeJanusz A. Ordover
& Robert D. Willig, Access and BundlinginHigh-Technology Markets, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND THE MICROsoFr MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKET PLACE

(Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999).
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The Chicago School analysis was incomplete because it did not address
the case in which tying is used to distort competition in a market that
is already oligopolistic. The post-Chicago literature, particularly the
Whinston model, has addressed this problem and, as a byproduct, provided a more general framework for tying analysis. Whinston's key contribution was to show that one could construct a theoretically rigorous
economic model in which a firm with market power could use tying in
an anticompetitive manner. This implies that false-acquittal costs may
be positive. However, this is not enough to make a detailed judgment
about the law (e.g., whether a per se prohibition is optimal) because we
need to have some sense of the relative frequencies of false-acquittal
and false-conviction costs.
C. A

DECISION-THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE
POST-CHICAGO LITERATURE

Having laid out the post-Chicago literature on tying and described
the fundamentals of the decision-theoretic approach, we now use that
approach to assess the literature. We first examine the post-Chicago
literature's implications for the continuation of the existing per se rule,
and then its implications for a rule of reason or modified per se analysis.
1. Implicationsfor Continuation of Per Se Rule
Recall that the post-Chicago literature arose in reaction to the Chicago
School's prescriptions that tying should be per se legal, not to the state
of the law. As we have suggested, nothing in this literature justifies
continuation of the per se illegal rule, even given its qualifications. The
D.C. Circuit explained in Microsoft 111123 that the existing per se rule
incorporates empirical proxies for a rule of reason analysis. However,
the test still works to exclude efficiency justifications in substantial areas
of application, notably the first-mover and product-differentiation
cases.1 24 In view of the importance of these settings, in terms of their
prevalence and in terms of their likelihood of generating litigation, we
think it is appropriate to treat the rule as including significant per
se prohibitions.
Within our decision-theoretic framework, there are two conceivable
foundations for a per se illegal rule. One possibility would be that the
courts could identify a checklist of conditions under which tying was
sufficiently likely to be anticompetitive that no further inquiry was merited. Under this "checklist" theory, courts could use the post-Chicago
121Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 87-88.
124See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing Jefferson Parish).
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literature to develop a stable list of features that justify application of
the per se prohibition. The other foundation for the per se prohibition
would be that the harmful effects of tying are so great relative to the
potential benefits that the courts would be willing to risk a high rate of
false convictions.
All of the post-Chicago models of anticompetitive harm from tying
rest on very specific assumptions about such issues as demand, costs,
timing of when firms enter or can enter the market, and the ways that
firms within the market compete. Within each model, it would be a
trivial exercise to modify the assumptions so that tying would not be a
profitable strategy. Of course, the tying that occurs in those models is
anticompetitive, so a per se law against tying would benefit consumers
within the hypothetical world of the model. In reality, though, there
are potentially beneficial effects of tying that the models exclude by
assumption. It is hard to see why one would ever choose not to consider
the possibility of these alternative explanations. Given the post-Chicago
models' reliance on assumptions that may not hold, and their exclusion
of obvious efficiency motivations, the post-Chicago models cannot provide a defensible checklist that courts could use in implementing a
modified per se prohibition.
As for quantification of costs and benefits, the post-Chicago models
give us little, if any, guidance. While the models lay out a set of assumptions under which tying is anticompetitive, none of the models lays a
serious framework for quantifying the costs of such behavior. To the
extent that tying lowers costs or provides convenience, there is no reason
to suppose that its benefits are insubstantial. Thus, the models provide
nojustification for being willing to tolerate large rates of false convictions.
In short, post-Chicago models do not provide a justification for the
existing per se rule. The models rely on assumptions that are by no
means generally valid, and exclude potential efficiency justifications that
are commonly asserted by firms. In addition, the models fail to quantify
the relative costs and benefits of tying.
Somewhat ironically, perhaps the clearest implication of the postChicago literature is that per se analysis is inappropriate. The postChicago literature implies that, in addition to market power and substantial foreclosure, one must have evidence of the presence of entry barriers
in the tied-good market, and that these conditions are necessary rather
than sufficient for tying to be harmful. It follows that instead of a per
se prohibition triggered by a finding that the tie-in involves separate
products, market power in the tying good, and substantial foreclosure
in the tied good, a superior rule would be one of per se legality unless
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these three elements are satisfied and scale economies are large relative
to the market in the tied good. An economically defensible, "neoclassical"
tying doctrine would require, at a minimum, evidence favorable to the
plaintiff on these four conditions in order to survive a motion for summary judgment.
The post-Chicago models could be used to formulate a rule of reason
approach or perhaps a doctrine that retains some elements of per se
analysis-provided evidence exists of market power in the tying good
and barriers to entry in the tied good. Under such a doctrine, a court
would have to weigh the likelihood that an example of tying or product
integration would be anticompetitive against the benefits from tying or
integration that defendants would inevitably present. In assessing the
implications of the post-Chicago literature, it is natural to examine what
insights it yields into what conditions in the tied market the court should
look to in assessing the likelihood that an example of tying could be
anticompetitive. We consider four conditions below: entry barriers,
complementary goods, network effects, and technologically advancing
markets.
2. Basic Conditions in the Market for the Tied Good
a. Entry barriers
One common link among all of the theories of anticompetitive tying
is that the market for the tied good has basic conditions that are conducive to market power. More precisely, the existing models are based on
2
the assumption of scale economies in the production of the tied good.1 1
Tying is anticompetitive because it denies an entrant the scale needed
126
to survive.
In particular, tying works in the Whinston model as an exclusionary
device only when scale economies in the tied good are large enough
relative to the market that the practice of tying makes the difference
between achieving or not achieving adequate scale. This implies that
finding large scale economies (relative to the market) should be a neces125 An area that arguably needs further exploration in the literature is whether tying
can be a successful strategy in the presence of entry barriers other than scale economies.
Because the direct mechanism through which tying is potentially anticompetitive is to
foreclose sales to competitors, it was natural for economic theorists to base their models
of anticompetitive tying on assumptions of scale economies. However, as was suggested
by Bain in Barriersto New Competition and subsequently proved more formally by Schmalensee (see the discussion in Part C.1 supra), there are limitations to the amount of market
power that can be attributable to scale economies.
16 In the presence of scale economies, tying is not the only strategy that might be used
to deter entry. Analysis of this class of problem dates back at least to BAIN, supra note 94.
For a more modern treatment, see Gilbert, supra note 95.
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sary condition for triggering a finding of an illegal tie. However, there
are two reasons that this additional prerequisite, when added to the
other prerequisites, would still fail tojustify a per se prohibition of tying.
First, as the discussion of the Whinston model makes clear, anticompetitive tying occurs only for certain levels of fixed cost or market
demand. Thus, the Whinston analysis and its various extensions imply
that courts should examine the effects of scale economies on a caseby-case basis. Second, the scale economies argument necessarily casts
antitrust into treacherous territory. One of the fundamental issues in
the enforcement of antitrust is the distinction between protecting competitors and protecting competition. When scale economies are present,
this distinction gets blurry. Harm to a competitor can prevent it from
being able to achieve the necessary scale economies and thereby induce
exit. While it is easy to construct models in which the distinction between
competing vigorously and harming competitors is clear, in evaluating
the facts associated with any real market the distinction is unlikely to
be clear.
One way to minimize the risk of false convictions would be to place
a high burden on the plaintiff to make the case in light of demand and
cost conditions that, with a high degree of certainty, the competitor
could survive without the tie but not with it. In addition, credence should
be given to claims of efficiency, absent strong evidence to the contrary.
If courts were to adopt a rule of reason or modify the per se rule,
they might rely on an analysis of whether the market for the tied good
was susceptible to market power. Courts could, for example, apply a test
similar to the "dangerous probability of success" standard in the attemptsto-monopolize doctrine. 27 Under such an analysis, the courts would
reject tying claims in settings where market conditions, such as easy
entry or competitive structural features, indicate that the prospects for
successful monopolization of the tied-good market are low. In implementing the test, courts could employ a variety of options that would
have the effect of trading off the risks of false convictions and false
acquittals. For example, in undergoing an analysis of the basic conditions
of the tied market, the courts could inquire not only whether tying could
be a successful monopolization strategy but also whether there are other
strategies that would be equally plausible. If there are, then the costs of
127 The legal test governing attempts to monopolize was first articulated byjustice Holmes
in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). The test requires the plaintiff to
prove intent to monopolize plus a "dangerous probability of success." See, e.g., HERBERT

HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE

§ 6.5 at 280 (2d ed. 1999). The "dangerous probability" part of the attempt test generally
requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant has market power in the relevant market.
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
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a false acquittal would be relatively low because the seller could substitute
128
some other monopolization strategy for the tie.
b. Systems goods
As we argued in Part II.C, Whinston's model successfully demonstrates
the fragility of the single-monopoly-profit theory. Since this theory had
been used to dismiss concerns about the incentive to leverage market
power in one good into complementary goods, then one might be
tempted to conclude that courts should be particularly suspicious of tying
close complements, or system goods, such as computers and peripherals,
cameras and lenses, and the like. Such a conclusion would be a mistake,
however. Under a decision-theoretic approach, the appropriate legal
rules turn on the relative risks of false acquittals and false convictions.
It may well be that the risk of false acquittals from either per se legality
or a strong burden of proof on plaintiffs is higher with complementary
goods than for independent goods. Before adopting a stricter standard
in response, however, one must ask whether the risk of false convictions
from a stricter standard for complementary goods would be correspondingly greater.
While it may well be true that anticompetitive tying is more plausible
with system goods, the potential benefits from tying are also more plausible. First of all, the demands for components of systems goods are
necessarily positively correlated. People who buy computers are more
likely to demand computer monitors than people who do not. With
positively correlated demands, it is much more plausible that direct
cost savings and increased convenience are real benefits of tying. Legal
hostility toward tying under such circumstances would pose a risk of
preventing these benefits from occurring.
As was argued above, the theories of anticompetitive tying require the
potential for market power in the markets for both goods. Legal hostility
to tying of complementary goods would necessarily create a bias in the
system toward having the components of systems goods provided by
different firms. If one knew that market power would be present in the
sale of each component of a systems good, then consumers would benefit
if the same firm or firms were suppliers in both markets. Having separate
firms with market power in the provision of complementary goods results
128For example, the firm could set prices for two products that it sells in a way that
accomplishes the same effect as a tie-in. See Carlton & Waldman, supranote 102, at 17-18.
If the resultant prices are not predatory, then the alternative pricing strategy is certainly
legal. Moreover, the legal standard governing predatory pricing places a high burden of
proof on the plaintiff. See generally Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 37 (criticizing
existing standard for predation and proposing an alternative). Thus, while a per se prohibition applies to tying, the alternative pricing strategy would be treated under a test that
clearly disadvantages plaintiffs.
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in double marginalization. Also, the Farrell-Katz argument notwithstanding, it can result in inefficient incentives for research and development,
as the reward for innovation to complementary monopolists is smaller
than the reward to the integrated monopolist. Thus, a legal bias toward
having separate providers of complementary goods would result in economic inefficiency.
In response, one might argue that hostility toward tying would not
eliminate the natural advantage that the seller of one systems component
would have in the market for the complementary good. Even without
tying, a firm with market power in the sale of computers would have an
incentive to compete more aggressively in the sale of monitors. However,
it is possible to use pricing to create a "virtual tie"-even when a literal
tie is not in place-by setting the price for the complementary good at
a level that makes entry unprofitable. 129 Thus, to be effective, a ban on
tying must also limit the seller's freedom to offer discounts for buying
both components of the system. There may, however, be real cost savings
from selling a system instead of individual components, and it would be
desirable for firms to pass some of these cost savings on to consumers.
Legal hostility toward tying, which in turn treats discounts as virtual ties,
would limit such desirable behavior. One might argue that a seller would
be allowed to rebut allegations that its pricing constituted an illegal tie
by demonstrating that its package discounts merely reflected cost savings.
Such a doctrine would place the burden of proof on defendants. Given
the risk of error and the cost of litigation, some sellers would simply
forgo the practice rather than put themselves in the position of having
to defend it in court. That is, such a legal doctrine would entail a higher
risk of false convictions, with additional false-conviction costs.
Because both the benefits from tying and the risk of anticompetitive
harm are higher for system goods than for others, the stakes in tying
doctrine are higher. Thus, the courts should arguably be more willing
to devote their efforts to such cases. The point that the stakes are higher
for complementary goods does not, however, imply that the courts should
be more hostile to tying in these cases.
c. Network externalities
As described in Part II.C.2 above, Carlton and Waldman lay out the
economic logic under which bundling can be used to gain an advantage
in a market with network externalities. Recall the basic set-up of the
model. Widgets and gadgets are complements. One firm initially has a
'2 Carlton & Waldman, supra note 102, at 17-18 (introducing and analyzing effects of
"virtual tying" through pricing).
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monopoly over widgets, although subsequent entry into widgets is possible. Gadgets are subject to network externalities.
In assessing that model's potential contribution to the law, the key
issue is whether it justifies making the presence of network externalities
in the tied good a factor in judging that a tie is illegal. Within the
decision-theoretic framework, such a conclusion could be valid for one
of two reasons. The first would be if the model demonstrated that the
difference between the probability of anticompetitive tying and procompetitive tying was greater when the tied good is subject to network externalities. The second would be if there was reason to believe (either
because of the model or for some other reason) that the network externalities in the tied good makes the cost of a false acquittal greater relative
to the cost of a false conviction.
A topic of particular interest in the analysis of network industries is
whether the better standard necessarily comes to dominate. It is theoretically possible that if an inferior standard gets a headstart or has any
other sort of artificial advantage, then it could prevail over a superior
standard because of the network externality effect. 30 On the surface,
this possibility might seem to suggest that with network externalities in
the tied good, anticompetitive tying is both more likely and more costly
when it occurs. The argument that it is more likely would be that the
potential pay-off is greater. The argument that it is more costly is that
it results in everyone adopting the wrong standard.
Neither of these arguments is completely compelling as positive predictions, and they are even less compelling as justifications for making
network externalities in the tied good as a "plus factor" in determining
that a tie is illegal. First, as a matter of pure logic, laying out a set of
stylized assumptions under which tying is anticompetitive cannot possibly
justify conclusions about the probability of observing such occurrences.
Judging by academic interest in the topic, it appears that many economists
find compelling the hypothesis that markets can gravitate to the wrong
standard. One must consider, however, that the most commonly cited
example of the wrong standard prevailing is the QWERTY standard for
typewriter keyboards.' 3' The example continues to be cited even though
(1) it makes no logical sense, 132 and (2) there was never any evidence that
150Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75
AM. ECON. REv. 424 (1985).
"' See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 Am. ECON. REv. 332 (1985).
l31The explanation typically given is that once typewriters with the QWERTY standard
came into existence, all typists learned the QWERTY system. With all typists trained on
QWERTY, typewriter manufacturers only produced QWERTY typewriters. The training of
typists and the production of machines were mutually reinforcing, and no individual could
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QWERTY was worse than a competing standard. 3 3 Even if the QWERTY
example were a case of the choice of an inefficient standard, the lack
of a more recent example casts considerable doubt on the empirical
importance of the theoretical possibility that markets adopt the wrong
standard. Moreover, several examples in which new standards supplanted
old ones 3 4 suggest that such mistakes, if they indeed occur, are not
necessarily permanent.
Moreover, even if one could establish a significant probability of anticompetitive tying in the presence of network externalities, one would
need to consider the probability of error due to legal hostility toward tying
under such circumstances. The probability of error would be amplified by
the incentives competitors would have to bring a legal challenge Would
such hostility increase the risk of incorrectly rejecting the offering of
the firm that produces the complementary product?
In the Carlton-Waldman model of complementary products, a "virtual
tie" through pricing is as effective as an actual tie. 3 5 That is, the widget
producer can sell widgets and gadgets separately but charge a high price
for the former but not the latter. Because every consumer needs the
primary good (widget), the widget producer creates a virtual tie by raising
the price of the widget and reducing the price of the gadget to a level
that makes it impossible for a competing gadget producer to enter and
make a profit. However, a legal doctrine that attempts to prohibit virtual
ties necessarily would entail restrictions on the pricing of one firm in
the market but not the other. The possibility of sanctioning virtual ties
as well as actual ties necessarily increases the risk of false convictions,
since it would be difficult as a general matter to determine whether a
seller set its prices in order to compete effectively or to harm compe13 6
tition.
break the standard. That is, of course, until people started typing almost exclusively on
computers where a keyboard could easily be programmed to any more efficient standard.
Arguably, the evidence against the QWERTY myth began to mount with the introduction
of the IBM Selectric, which had detachable, relatively inexpensive "track balls" that could
be made to different standards. Once that technology became common, the switch to a
new supposedly improved standard would not require all or a substantial fraction of typists
to switch altogether. If the Dvorak standard were truly superior, an individual typist could
increase his typing speed (and thereby presumably command higher pay) by investing in
a set of Dvorak track balls and learning the new standard. No coordination with his
employer or with other typists would be necessary.
133See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33J.L. & ECON.1 (1990);
S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8J. ECON.
PERSP., Spring 1994, at 133.
134
For example, compact disks completely replaced records, and 3.5 inch diskettes
completely replaced 51/4
inch diskettes.
'35Carlton & Waldman, supra note 102, at 17-18.
i36
Admittedly, the choice here is between false acquittals and false convictions. A policy
that exempts virtual ties while restricting actual ties encourages firms to substitute the
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The fundamental dilemma of all leveraging policy relating to complementary goods is that it applies asymmetrically to one firm. Moreover,
there are compelling arguments why it is in society's interest to have
that particular firm prevail. If widgets and gadgets are complementary
and both are going to be monopolized, then consumers are generally
better off if a single firm has the monopoly over both.
To be sure, there is a counterargument, which is that complementary
monopolists are the most likely entrants into each other's markets and
therefore act as competitive constraints. The basis for the claim is sometimes based on capability. That is, by virtue of operating in the related
gadget market, a firm will have knowledge and other assets that make
entry into widgets easier. Because the same logic would seem to justify
protecting an inefficient widget producer, this rationale gets perilously
close to being a justification of protecting competitors for the sake of
protecting competition. A widget producer that is currently inefficient
often has a better chance of overtaking the leader than a new entrant. At
other times, the argument is based on incentives. A gadget monopolist's
margin in the gadget market gives it an extra incentive to enter the widget
market in order to bring widget prices down and stimulate demand for
the gadget. This argument turns a problem, excessive prices in each
market, into a virtue, an incentive to bring them down.
d. Technologically advancing versus stable markets
There is a longstanding issue about the relative role of antitrust in
stable as opposed to technologically advancing markets. 137 The view that
has probably predominated historically is that antitrust is better suited
to deal with stable markets than technologically advancing markets.
Within the context of decision theory, there are three parts to the
argument. The first is that the maintenance of market power is harder
in the presence of opportunities for technological advance. Thus, the
cost of false acquittals is less. The second is that short-run market power
is a necessary cost of generating technical change, and there is a concern
that antitrust enforcement focuses too narrowly at eliminating short-run
market power. Third, technologically advancing markets may be harder
for courts to understand so that the risk of incorrect decisions is greater.
former for the latter and generates false acquittals. However, a policy that restricts virtual
ties necessarily generates false convictions, for reasons given in the text. Moreover, legal
rules that restrict price cutting must be considered especially costly, since they work against
the fundamental policy of the antitrust laws. Any legal rule governing tying should be
capable of handling instances of actual and virtual tying with low error costs.
"I For one economic perspective on this view, see Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the
New Economy (Univ. of Chicago, John M. Olin Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 106
(2d Series) 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract-id=249316.
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Again, there is a dissenting view. One might argue that it is precisely
when a firm with market power faces the threat of being replaced by a
superior competitor that it has an incentive to use anticompetitive means
to thwart its rivals. Even if the positive part of the argument is true,
however, the policy implications are not clear. A firm with market power
that faces threats to its market has a strong incentive to use all means,
competitive and anticompetitive, that it has available. Thus, the fundamental policy dilemma of distinguishing competitive from anticompetitive actions applies in technologically advancing markets. Appropriate
policies turn on the relative probabilities and costs of false convictions
and false acquittals. Many of the arguments about the role of technological advance imply that the stakes are higher, but doubling the cost of
both types of possible mistakes does not justify a tilt toward stricter (or
less strict) enforcement policies.
e. Assessment
We conclude that each of the four tied-market conditions considered
in this section and emphasized by the post-Chicago literature-entry
barriers, complementary goods, network effects, and technologically
advancing markets-would be insufficient to justify a per se prohibition
even if coupled with the existing requirements for the per se rule. Given
the potential benefits of tying, none of these conditions raises the threat
of anticompetitive harm to a level that would justify the adoption of a
per se prohibition under any general set of conditions. It follows that
the post-Chicago literature should be interpreted as an argument for
applying a rule of reason analysis, rather than per se analysis, provided
that the plaintiff can pass the threshold requirements of proving that
the tie-in involves separate products, market power in the tying good,
substantial foreclosure in the tied good, and entry barriers in the tiedgood market.
Further, in view of the frequency with which beneficial tying occurs,
a rule of reason analysis should be conducted in a manner that puts a
high burden of proof on the plaintiff. The reason for this is that falseconviction costs are likely to be high relative to false-acquittal costs in a
setting in which the challenged conduct has many procompetitive uses.
In order to minimize error costs, the proof standard should require the
plaintiff, in addition to meeting the four threshold requirements, to
exclude the possibility that the tie-in could serve beneficial purposes.1i 8
138In particular, the plaintiff should be required to show (subject to a high standard
of proof) that tying is profitable to the defendant only if it has an exclusionary effect,
and that the cost of tying to the defendant is likely to be recouped through its exclusionary
impact. This approach is consistent with the vertical restraints test proposed by Janusz
Ordover and Robert Willig. SeeJanusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, Access and Bundling
in High-Technology Markets, in
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IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW: TYING STANDARDS
AND TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION
The post-Chicago literature has not had a big impact on tying law.
Except for Eastman Kodak, the important Supreme Court tying decisions-IBM, InternationalSalt, Northern Pacific,FortnerII, Jefferson Parishare consistent with and reasoned within the classical framework. Even
Eastman Kodak serves to some extent as an illustration of the post-Chicago
School's tenuous influence, since its reach has been severely limited by
lower courts. 13 9
In this part we consider whether the decision-theoretic approach provides a justification for the lax, or non-interventionist, "sole purpose"
standard governing technological integration (Leasco) in almost every
circuit. There are two sub-issues connected to this: Is the sole-purpose
standard optimal, or should we prefer instead a per se test or a rule
of reason test? Does the risk that sellers will substitute technological
integration for contractual tying militate in favor of applying a more
stringent test (e.g., rule of reason or per se analysis) to technological
tying?
A.

THE OPTIMAL LEGAL STANDARD FOR INTEGRATION

To simplify the comparison of legal standards, suppose we are comparing two, a strict one and a lax one. For example, the strict standard
could be the combination of the Caldera proof standard ("significant
technological benefit") and the Microsoft III substantive standard (rule
of reason), while the lax standard could be the combination of the
Microsoft Iproof standard ("plausible claim") and the Leasco substantive
test (sole purpose). The existence of separate substantive and procedural
tests suggests four potential combinations of substantive and procedural
standards that courts could apply. However, for our purposes now, it is
enough to consider only two extremes. We know that the relevant choice
is between subjecting product integration and contractual tying to the
same doctrines, or remaining with the current regime, Leasco, which
creates a much more lenient or deferential review standard for product
integration decisions. This difference in standards would remain, though
clearly to a lesser degree, even if courts adopted the rule of reason
approach to contractual tying. Is this difference in standards defensible?
ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKET PLACE

(Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard

eds., 1999). We should note that this standard also has the substantial virtue of being
equally applicable to cases of "virtual tying" through pricing (see supra Part IV.B.2), since
it is a generalization of the Brooke Group predatory pricing standard.
139See Metzler, 19 F. Supp.2d 1345 (tie between original equipment and derivative aftermarkets can be deemed unlawful, when the original equipment market is competitive,
only if the tie-in is the result of a change in the seller's marketing policy).
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Under the decision-theoretic approach, the choice between strict and
lax standards is determined by three factors. The first is the base-rate
probability that product integration is benign, or not anticompetitive.
As this probability increases, the lax standard becomes more desirable
as a means of minimizing error costs. The second factor is the ratio of
the cost of a false conviction to the cost of a false acquittal, which also
enhances the desirability of the lax standard. An assumption that this
ratio is higher in the case of technological tying would be justified if
the benefits of technological tying were typically greater than the benefits
due to contractual tying. In this case, false-conviction costs would be
relatively high in the case of technological integration, other things
being equal. Alternatively, the ratio of false-conviction to false-acquittal
costs may be relatively high because the costs of false acquittals are
relatively low in the case of technological integration. This assumption
would be justifiable if in markets where integration is common, such as
software, the market positions of dominant firms were especially vulnerable to the innovative efforts of rivals. 140 The third factor determining the
choice between strict and lax standards is relative probabilities of false
convictions and false acquittals. We do not mean to suggest that this
information is objectively observable. Rather, a choice of one legal standard over another rests on implicit assumptions about these values.
Consider the first factor: the base-rate probability of harm. Is there a
good reason to believe that the base-rate probability of anticompetitive
harm is larger in the case of technological integration than in the case
of contractual tying? We do not believe so. Whether the seller ties two
goods contractually or technologically, the foreclosure effect on rival
14 1
sellers should be the same.
Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that the base-rate probability
of anticompetitive harm is lower for technological integration than for
contractual tying. The technological integrator incurs a substantial sunk
cost in setting up a specialized production process for the integrated
product. The integrator incurs a relatively large opportunity cost as well.
Technological integration is difficult to reverse, relative to contractual
Although these examples are obviously one-sided, one need only reverse them to see

140

the case for the opposite argument. For example, if, in software markets, the positions of
dominant firms are especially resistant to the efforts of rivals to displace them, then the
cost of a false conviction relative to a false acquittal is somewhat lower, other things being
equal, than the ordinary case.
41Technological integration may have weaker foreclosure effects, given that some of
these instances involve integration that does not foreclose rival sellers. For example, in
Microsoft III rivals arguably were not foreclosed by the integration of Microsoft's browser
and operating system, since a consumer who wanted to use the biggest rival, Netscape,
could use Microsoft's browser to download Netscape's from the Web.
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tying. In addition, the seller's decision to integrate two products, A and
B, makes it more difficult, in most cases, for the consumer to reverse
the decision by combining A with another good C. 142 In other words,
technological integration entails sunk costs that are generally larger than
those associated with contractual tying. The risks are larger for the
technological integrator, and the market is likely to impose relatively
severe penalties for mistakes-in comparison to contractual tying.'43
Now consider the second factor: the relative ratios of false-conviction
and false acquittal costs. We noted that it would be justifiable to assume
that this ratio is larger for technological tying if the benefits from technological integration were typically greater than the benefits from contractual tying. Since technological integration will typically involve goods
that are functional complements, in the sense that they are often used
together, this seems plausible. Consider pencils and erasers, cameras
and lenses, cars and engines, or computers and monitors. Although this
is a biased sample because these are technological bundles that have
survived in the market, there is a plausible argument in each case that
the benefits of integration exceed the benefits of a contractual tie.
At the risk of belaboring the point, take the case of pencils and erasers,
probably the simplest integrated product commonly used at work. The
integrated product obviously offers benefits that are not provided by the
contractual tie of a pencil and an eraser. The connected eraser does
not reduce the utility of the pencil, and it provides certainty that the
most important functional complement to the pencil will always be there.
This example suggests that even the most trivial cases of integration,
bordering on a mere "bolting together," can provide substantial benefits
144
beyond the contractual tie.
Last, consider the probabilities of false convictions and false acquittals.
If false-conviction costs, relative to false-acquittal costs, are higher under
412
Of course, this is not true in every case. Recall that a seller's decision to integrate a
browser with an operating system may facilitate the consumer's decision to use another
firm's browser-by making it easy for the consumer to use the Web to download an
alternative browser.
143One might argue that there is another side of the coin: technological integration
increases the base-rate probability of harm when it enhances the credibility of an incumbent
firm's exclusionary threat. While this is a theoretical possibility, we believe that firms that
want to tie goods contractually would generally find less risky forms of commitment than
to integrate them physically.
144The integrated pencil/eraser example also carries an important lesson for the legal
standard governing technological integration. Any test that removes immunity for instances
of mere "bolting together" should do so only when the bolting provides no significant
benefits beyond what a consumer could gain on his own by purchasing the two goods on
the market and pasting them together. In other words, the Leasco standard (see supra Part
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technological integration than under contractual tying, as we have suggested, then we should avoid the legal standard that has the higher ratio
of false conviction to false acquittal probability. Given this, we should
prefer the lax to the strict legal standard in the area of technological integration.
Recall that we are considering the choice between two extremes: a
strict legal standard involving a combination of the balancing test of
Microsoft III and the proof standard of Caldera, and a lax legal standard
involving a combination of the sole-purpose test of Leasco with the proof
standard of Microsoft II. The Leasco test declares the defendant the winner
if there is a substantial technological benefit, while the Microsoft III test
requires the court to go further and balance the benefits of technological
integration against its competitive harms. The strict legal standard, as
defined, clearly has a higher ratio of false conviction to false acquittal
probability.
The upshot of this argument is that the relatively lax sole-purpose
standard applied to technological tying in most circuits seems to be
justifiable on error cost grounds. Of course, we do not have enough
information to be certain of this because we cannot observe the relevant
error costs and probabilities. However, the decision of courts to settle
on the least interventionist of the three substantive legal standards available (per se, rule of reason, sole purpose) appears consistent with plausible a priori judgments regarding base-rate probabilities, error rates, and
error costs.
One might argue that a different standard for technological integration isjustifiable but that courts have gone too far by giving the technological integrator more freedom than the law should allow. However, there
is no reason to believe that any of the stricter standards available (rule
of reason, per se illegality) could be applied without generating significant false conviction costs. Consider the rule of reason test of Microsoft
II. The seller's ex ante judgment regarding prospective consumer benefits may turn out to be incorrect ex post. In many of these cases, the
product will not survive in the market. However, in the cases where it
does survive, the seller faces the risk under Microsoft III that a court will
later determine that the consumer benefits were insufficient to outweigh
competitive harms to rivals. 4 Facing this risk, many firms contemplating
II.A.3) should be applied not with a view to the ease with which the goods can be integrated,
but with a view toward the benefits consumers derive.
"I As a concrete example of this danger, return to the Caldera case (see supra Part
II.A.4.b). The Calderacourt applied the substantive standard of Leascowith a more stringent
proof standard (significant technological improvement). In refusing to grant summary
judgment, the court relied heavily on claims that the integration was technologically easy,
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the integration of two products will do so only when they can be relatively
sure that a court would not later find that the additional utility was
46
insufficient. This is bound to deter product innovation efforts.'
It does not advance the case for a strict standard to say that courts
already examine product design decisions under product liability law.
First, there may be too many false convictions in the product liability
'
context, 47
and, if this is the case, there is no reason to transfer the same
process to the antitrust arena. Second, there are substantial differences
between the product liability and antitrust contexts that make it inappropriate to think that whatever courts do in one setting they can do in the
other. In the product,liability setting, courts typically refuse to engage
in risk/utility analysis when the risk characteristics are so obvious that
the product meets "consumer expectations.' 48 There is no analogous
safe harbor in the antitrust setting. 49 In addition, excluding latent-risk
cases like asbestos or silicone implants, the risks considered in the product liability context are often fairly obvious, as in the case of a lawn
mower with an exposed blade. The potential competitive risks (e.g.,
entry deterrence) in antitrust, however, are relatively uncertain and
highly contingent on the way rivals and consumers react. In light of the
thicker blanket of uncertainty in the antitrust context, a competitive risk/
utility test could easily create significandy larger innovation disincentives
than we observe in the product liability setting.
To this point we have considered whether the sole-purpose test is
preferable to a more stringent standard, such as the rule of reason, for
the general category of technological integration. Is the case of software
bundling different? The D.C. Circuit in Microsoft III refused to follow
the result of the IBM cases, which generally follow the Leasco standard,
on the ground that those cases involved the bundling of software and
Caldera, 72 F. Supp.2d at 1324, rather than focusing on the benefits the integration provided
to consumers.
116 Put another way, there is no reason to believe that an unambiguous improvement
(or "free lunch") can be had by moving to a stricter standard. Another alternative to
consider is the combination of the sole-purpose test with the more demanding proof
standard of Caldera. To the extent that this proof standard raises the ratio of the false
conviction to the false acquittal probability, it is probably undesirable and certainly not
an unambiguous improvement over the lax standard.
147PAUL H. RUBIN, TORT REFORM BY CONTRACT 62-63 (1993).

118
See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at
698-99 (5th ed. 1984).
149This is not to deny the existence of "screens" of any sort in the antitrust context.
Firms that have little or no market power are effectively exempt from tying and Section
2 claims. However, the key difference is the predictability of the legal test. For the firms
that are subject to the test (i.e., that may be sued), the "competitive balancing test" seems
to be more uncertain than the risk-utility test in products liability law.
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hardware. 150 The implication of Microsoft III is that the bundling of
software to software, or more specifically a software application to a
software platform, should be treated under a different test than that
applied to other cases of product integration (Leasco). We can see no
reason for creating such a distinction. As the D.C. Circuit implicitly
acknowledged, the process of "creative destruction" observed in many
innovative industries is no less intense in software.'15 To the extent a
non-interventionist legal standard protects the innovative process from
being burdened by litigation, the case for adopting the Leasco standard
would seem to be even stronger for software bundling.
In terms of our framework-which examines the base-rate probability
of harm, relative error probabilities, and relative error costs-we see
no reason to treat software bundling as less deserving of the noninterventionist standard than other types of product integration. Software applications have become part of the operating system over time
for pretty much the same reason as the eraser/pencil integration: to
provide certainty and coordination in operations among complementary
tools. 52 As long as this benefit cannot be achieved through contractual
bundling, we should expect the ratio of false conviction to false acquittal costs to be larger for software integration than for software contractual
bundling. In short, the error cost rationale for the Leascostandard appears
to be no weaker in the area of software integration.
B.

THE SUBSTITUTION CRITIQUE

Lessig has argued that particularly in the case of computer software,
different standards for contractual and technological tying will distort
product design decisions. 53 If the standards are different, a company
that would prefer to do contractual tying to exclude competitors might
choose product integration instead in order to be on more solid legal
ground. Under such circumstances, not only does an objectionable form
of tying escape legal sanction, but there is an additional cost to society.
The seller's preference for contractual tying likely reflects the judgment
that putting the tied products in the same box is cheaper than integrating
them technologically. If so, then even though the best outcome is not
150Microsoft 111, 253 F.3d at 91-92.
"I Id. at 93-95 (referring in various passages to dynamic innovation in the software
market).
152See Steven J. Davis, Jack MacCrisken & Kevin M. Murphy, Economic Perspectives on
Software Design: PC Operating Systems and Platforms, available at http://gsbwww
.uchicago.edu/fac/steven.davis/research.
'53 See Microsoft 111, 87 F. Supp. 2d (No. 98-1233), Brief of Professor Lawrence Lessig as
Amicus Curiae (filed Feb. 1, 2000).
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to have tying at all (again, on the assumption that the seller uses tying
to harm competition), contractual tying is a better outcome than technological tying.
To evaluate Lessig's "substitution critique," we first lay out the decisiontheoretic assumptions under which product integration and contractual
tying should be treated differently. We initially assume that a firm has
only one natural tying strategy (i.e., contractual or technological) so that
choosing one based on the difference in legal standards is not an issue.
The decision-theoretic approach entails evaluating each rule based
on a weighted error rate, with weights reflecting the relative costs of
different classes of error. To implement this analysis, one selects a benchmark type of error. In what follows, we let a false conviction be the
benchmark.
As described in Part III.A, one of the key insights of decision theory
is that the fraction of cases that are harmful is a relevant consideration
in formulating the legal rule. Table 1 summarizes the notation and
provides an assumed value for each variable. In order to assess the Lessig
critique, one must begin with values under which it would be optimal
to have different standards for different classes of tying assuming that
sellers could not substitute technological for contractual tying. These
values have that feature.
Table 1
Nature of Information
% of technological ties that are harmful
% of contractual ties that are harmful
Strict standard probability illegal given benign
Strict standard probability legal given harmful
Lax standard probability illegal given benign
Lax standard probability legal given harmful
Ratio of cost of false acquittal to false conviction

Hypothesized Value
1%

5%
1%
0%
0%
20%
3

Given these values, we can compute the weighted error rates for each
standard and rule. For the strict standard for contractual tying, the
54
weighted error rate is:'
"I To be precise, let the notation Co indicate the cost of other errors relative to a false
conviction. Thus, if "A" stands for a false acquittal, then C(A) = 3 means a false acquittal
is as costly as three false convictions. The choice of benchmark is simply a matter of
labeling and does not have any substantive implications. The conclusions are the same
when we view a false acquittal as being three times as costly as a false conviction as when
we view a false conviction as being one third as costly as a false acquittal. Each rule has
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95% x 1% + 5% x 0% x 3 = 0.95%
For the lax standard for contractual tying, the weighted error rate is:
95% x 0% + 5% x 20% x 3 = 3.00%
The strict standard is therefore better for contractual tying. For the strict
standard for technological tying, the weighted error rate is:
99% x 1% + 1% x 0% x 3

=

0.99%

For the lax standard for technological tying, the weighted error rate is:
99% x 0% + 1% x 20% x 3

=

0.60%

The lax standard is therefore better for technological tying.
While there is no reason to believe that these particular assumptions
are realistic, they do make clear the types of implicit assumptions that
justify a different standard for technological and contractual tying. In
this particular set of parameters, the difference entails the difference in
the fraction of all cases that are benign. Although not embodied in this
particular set of values, an alternative justification would be that the
ratio of the cost of a false acquittal to the cost of a false conviction is
lower for technological tying. Such an assumption would be justified if
the benefits from technological integration were typically greater than
the benefits (reduced transactions cost or greater convenience) from
contractual tying. The third possible justification would be that the rates
of false convictions or false acquittals would be different for the two
different types of tying.
With this example as a base case, we can now assess the implication
of Lessig's argument that different standards for technological and contractual tying create a perverse incentive for firms that would normally
use contractual tying to choose technological tying instead. Qualitatively,
of course, the effect he focuses on is a real possibility. As with many of
the other issues in this debate, however, the implications cannot be
a weighted error rate for each class of tying. Let w(ij) be the weighted error rate of
applying rule i to class j, where i = s indicates a strict legal standard, i = e indicates a lax
legal standard, j = b indicates contractual tying, and j = t indicates technological tying.
For example, w(e,t) indicates the weighted error rate from applying a lax standard to
technological tying. Let H(j) be the percentage of all cases of tying in class j that are
harmful. In addition, we need to know the error rates associated with each type of rule.
Let FC(i) and FA(i) be the rates of false convictions and false acquittals for rule i. As we
define the terms here, the error rates are conditional probabilities. For example, FC(s)
is the percentage of benign cases for which the strict standard generates false convictions;
and FA(s) is the percentage of harmful cases for which the strict standard generates false
acquittals. With these terms defined, the general formula for the weighted error rate is:
w(ij) = [1-H(j)] FC(i) + H(j) FA(i) C(A).
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inferred from the qualitative point alone. The frequency of such switching and the costs of it when it occurs are essential inputs to the
proper conclusions.
If all firms could substitute technological ties for illegal contractual
ties, then it would be impossible to have a stricter standard for contractual
ties than for technological ties. Of course, under such circumstances, a
uniform lax standard for both might yield better results than a uniform
strict standard. Suppose that 90% of all instances of bundling are technological. The weighted overall error rate for the strict standard would
then be:' 55
10% x [95% x 1% + 5% x 0% x 3]
+ 90% x [99% x 1% + 1% x 0% x 3] = 0.986%
The weighted overall error rate for the lax standard would be:
10% x [95% x 0% + 5% x 20% x 3]
+ 90% x [99% x 0% +

1% x 20% x 3] = 0.840%

It follows that the lax standard is preferable.
In reality, of course, it is not always possible (or worthwhile) to substitute technological tying for contractual tying. If only a fraction of firms
that would like to use contractual ties would switch to technological ties
in response to a difference in the legal standard, then it is feasible to
have different standards. To extend our analysis to consider these cases,
three more pieces of information are necessary. Naturally, one is the
fraction of illegal contractual cases that would switch to technological
tying under a mixed standard. The other necessary pieces of information
are the relative costs of the two additional classes of inefficient outcomes
created by the possibility of switching. Both classes entail using technological rather than contractual tying simply to take advantage of the mixed
legal standard. 15 6 The difference between them concerns whether the
tie is inherently harmful.
155Define W(ib,i,) to be the weighted overall error rates where ib is an index for the
legal standard used for contractual tying and i, is an index for the legal standard for
technological tying. In contrast to w(ij), which is an error rate for a single class of tying
(i.e., contractual or technological), W(ib,i,) is an error rate for both classes of tying pooled
together into one group. Also, let T be the fraction of all instances of tying that are
technological. The general formula (assuming a uniform standard for the two classes of
tying) is: W(ib,i,) = (1-T){[1-H(b)] FC(ib) + H(b) FA(ib) C(A)} + T{[1-H(t)] FC(i,) + H(t)
FA(i,) C(A)}.
156That is, contractual tying would be used under a lax standard for contractual tying.
Under a strict standard, however, the tie is illegal.
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Table 2 is an extension of Table 1 that adds the information needed
to evaluate the Lessig argument, the notation, and a set of hypothesized values.
Table 2
Nature of Information

Hypothesized Value

% of technological ties that are harmful
% of contractual ties that are harmful
Strict standard probability illegal given benign
Strict standard probability legal given harmful
Lax standard probability illegal given benign
Lax standard probability legal given harmful
Ratio of cost of false acquittal to false conviction
% of ties that are inherently technological
Cost of harmful switch under mixed standard
Cost of beneficial switch under mixed standard
% of illegal contractual ties that switch under
mixed standard

1%
5%
1%
0%
0%
20%
3
90%
4
0.5
7.5%

With these assumptions, the weighted over-all error rate with a strict
I5 7
standard for technological tying and a lax one for technological tying is:
10% x [95% x 1% x (92.5% + 0.5 x 7.5%) + 5% x (0% x 3 + 7.5% x 4)]
+ 90% x [99% x 0% + 1% x 20% x 3] = 0.781%
This weighted over-all error rate for the mixed standard is lower than
the 0.84% derived above for the universal lax standard, which is in
turn less than the 0.986% for the universal strict standard. Given these
assumed parameter values, therefore, a strict standard for contractual
tying and a lax standard for technological tying is optimal even though:
(1) the discrepancy in the standard induces some cases of product
integration simply to avoid the standard; and (2) the relative costs of
such cases are quite high.
17 Let M be the fraction of illegal contractual cases that would switch to technological
tying under a mixed standard. Let C(HS) be the cost (relative to a false conviction) of a
harmful switch and C(BS) be the cost (again, relative to a false conviction) of a benign
switch. A harmful switch is similar to a false acquittal. Absent the legal asymmetry, however,
the seller would have an incentive to make the efficient choice between a contractual and
a technological tie. A harmful switch is therefore worse than a false acquittal and we
should expect C(HS) > C(A). A beneficial switch is better than a false conviction because
the benign tie is allowed to exist. It is nonetheless worse than keeping the tie contractual
and making it legal. Since all costs are measured relative to a false conviction, 1 > C(FS)
> 0. The general formula is:
W(s,f) = (1-T){[1-H(b)] FC(s) [(1- M) + M C(BS)] + H(b) {FA(s) C(A) + [1-FA(s)] M
C(HS)}} + T{[1-H(t)] x FC(f) + H(t) x C(A) x FA(f)}.
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The above example does not prove that the optimal legal standard is
strict for contractual tying and lax for technological tying.15 8 It is easy to
assume other values for the parameters in which the opportunity to
switch makes it optimal to have a uniform standard even though a mixed
standard would be best if switching were impossible. Nevertheless, the
Lessig critique cannot stand as an entirely theoretical point. It is only
valid to the extent that the effect underlying it is sufficiently important
empirically to outweigh other considerations. Moreover, to the extent
that the opportunity to switch from contractual to technological tying
makes a uniform standard necessary, the appropriate uniform standard
is not necessarily a strict one.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have reviewed both legal doctrine toward tying and
the development of the academic literature on tying doctrine from the
Chicago critique of classical doctrine to post-Chicago revisionism. As we
have argued, the post-Chicago critiques are more compelling as attacks
on the logic of the Chicago School than on the substance of tying
doctrine as it exists.
Indeed, to the extent that the primary message of the Chicago critique
is that existing doctrine is overly hostile to tying, the post-Chicago literature is arguably more in agreement with the Chicago School than seems
to have been recognized. Even though we suspect that many post-Chicago
School writers would not support per se legality of either technological
or contractual tying, we reiterate that nothing in the literature justifies
the current per se illegality of tying even under the sorts of tightly
prescribed conditions that the courts have been seeking to articulate.
All the post-Chicago literature has done is to establish that if one rules
out any beneficial effects of tying, there are some conditions under
which tying could theoretically be harmful to consumers. It has, in our
view,justified focusing on complementary goods and restricting attention
to those instances where market analysis suggests that the tied good is
susceptible to market power. Within this broad class of cases, however,
it has not identified a narrow set of assumptions in which tying is likely
to be particularly harmful.
The broad class of cases identified by the post-Chicago literaturecomplementary goods, market power in the tying good, and the potential
158 Indeed, our arguments in the earlier parts of the text can be interpreted as favoring
a uniform "lax" standard. The new approach to contractual tying suggested in Part IV.B.4
would make the standards for contractual and technological tying roughly congruent.
Both standards would effectively place a high burden of proof on plaintiffs.
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for market power in the tied good-creates a fundamental dilemma for
tying policy. Given this set of conditions, the plausible market outcomes
are complementary (or successive) monopoly and integrated monopoly.
Since tying doctrine necessarily places limits on one (or possibly a small
number) of firms in a market but not others, it risks creating a bias for
complementary monopoly. To be sure, more complicated economic
analysis suggests that the case for integrated monopoly is not as airtight
as the simple analysis makes it appear. Still, in deciding legal doctrine
toward tying, courts mustjudge whether these qualifications in the literature overturn the main thrust of the basic economics of how complementarity affects incentives.
Indeed, more generally, the courts need to make a judgment about
the relative frequencies of harmful tying under a lax legal standard on
the one hand and the beneficial tying that will not occur under a stricter
standard. In so doing, they should recognize that tying is so pervasive
even in competitive markets that there is ample evidence that procompetitive tying is a common occurrence. This is particularly the case with
technological tying because technological tying often is synonymous with
improving a product by adding features to it.

